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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) Projects 
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Comparative Study between Vietnam and Nepal 
 
By Yui Satoh 
 
The thesis investigates how Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) projects involve forest-dependent people, especially 
indigenous people, in Vietnam and Nepal by utilizing a community-based approach. 
At the state level, the Government of Vietnam actively promotes REDD+ project 
implementation, and the international expectation towards Vietnam is high. However, 
Vietnam has problems of land rights of indigenous people, which negatively affect 
REDD+ implementation in terms of community participation. On the other hand, 
Nepal is said to be a successful case of community forest management. The 
government of Nepal provides a large portion of the forest management rights to local 
communities, which is proven to be effective in the REDD+ projects. The thesis 
compares the two cases and makes recommendations to achieve equitable REDD+ 
implementation, especially for Vietnam. 
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 Climate change attracted the attention of both developed and developing 
countries in the late twentieth century as it has great impacts on human activities. The 
rise of sea level and the desertification of areas are a few examples of the impacts. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) in 1988, to provide “the world with a clear scientific view on 
the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts” (IPCC). The IPCC states in the Fourth Assessment Report: 
Climate Change 2007 that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now 
evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (30). The 
IPCC also concludes that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic GHG concentrations” (5), which expresses the necessity of urgent 
adaptation and mitigation to climate change. 
 Another institution that is crucial for the issues of climate change is the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
UNFCCC is built on the scientific evidence of the IPCC’s First Assessment Report in 
1990, and was signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro (FitzRoy and Papyrakis 105). Since the 
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ratification, annual conference meetings of the parties called the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) are held. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP 3. Both 
developed and developing countries had their own interests and were reluctant to 
sacrifice themselves, and the conference ended up with the agreement that 
industrialized nations (Annex I countries) would reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by and average of 5% during 2008-2012 compared to 1990 levels, which 
Felix FitzRoy and Elissaios Papyrakis state as “very modest” (106). Furthermore, the 
United States, which emitted a considerable amount of GHG did not ratify the 
Protocol, and Canada became the first state that withdrew from the Protocol.  
 The Kyoto Protocol lacked a financial incentive for developing countries to 
reduce deforestation (Leggett and Lovell 116). Deforestation and forest degradation, 
mainly conversion of forest land to agricultural land, account for approximately 20% 
of the total GHG emissions. Therefore, to achieve reducing emissions from the forest 
sector is crucial in mitigating climate change (UN-REDD “About REDD+”; 
UNFCCC “Reducing Emissions”). This led to the proposal that requests rewards to 
developing countries generated from carbon finance. This is called Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation including the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (REDD+), which was first introduced by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica at 
the Conference of the Parties 11 (COP 11) in 2005. The main objective of REDD+ is 
“to provide positive financial incentives to countries to reduce emissions through 
avoided deforestation and forest degradation, and to compensate these countries based 
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on their performance” (Brockhaus, Gregorio, and Mardiah 1).  
REDD+ is supposed to benefit developing countries, by offering 
opportunities for developing countries to participate in carbon markets, and ultimately 
get benefits not by high-cost technical innovation that would impact economic 
growth, but by avoiding reduction of forests. However, a number of problems arose. 
One of them is the structural shortages of REDD+ and involved institutions. As 
REDD+ involves a number of different stakeholders, such as international 
organizations and the private sector, the mechanisms of REDD+ is becoming more 
preferable to the North and the private sector, which regard carbon as commodity and 
ignore the change of local communities’ livelihoods. Furthermore, at the project level, 
a lack of community participation, which is the focus of this thesis, is reported. 
Projects of REDD+ are decided at the state level, and the implementation is carried 
out at the local level, which means that it requires active community participation. 
REDD+ projects limit the use of forest and forest resources, and the scheme provides 
rewards directly to those who successfully reduce carbon emissions by maintaining or 
enhancing the carbon sequestration (Larson et al. 679). This means that the clear 
distinction of land right holders is essential, which is often lacking in developing 
countries. 
In this thesis, I will conduct comparative research on REDD+ projects in 
Vietnam and Nepal, highlighting the issues of community participation and land 
tenure security, and analyze the implementation in both countries respectively. Secure 
tenure is essential in REDD+ implementation since REDD+ rewards and compensates 
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those who avoid reducing carbon sequestration of forests. If tenure of local 
communities in forests is not secured, a possibility occurs that they are excluded from 
benefit allocation (Larson et al. 679). In Vietnam, the national level REDD+ 
discussion is actively promoted. In fact, the reliance of the UN-REDD Programme on 
Vietnam in terms of piloting various projects shows the international expectation of 
REDD+ in Vietnam. However, the projects have some problems of land tenure, which 
are mainly unequal land allocation to indigenous people in forests and the discrepancy 
of territorial boundaries between customary law and statutory law that causes 
insufficient community participation, while Nepal is said to be successful in terms of 
community participation. I will analyze the factors that impede the REDD+ 
implementation in Vietnam. 
1.2. Research Questions 
There are three research questions that I would like to address. First, I ask 
‘how local community members, especially indigenous people, are involved in 
REDD+ projects in Vietnam and Nepal?’ Indigenous people, or ethnic minorities, 
which the government of Vietnam officially calls them, are an important component 
of local communities yet are often economically and politically marginalized. 
However, as mentioned, REDD+ projects are implemented at a local level, so it is 
essential that local community members, including indigenous people, understand and 
cooperate with and benefit from the projects. In order to promote their understanding, 
persistent effort is necessary from various actors, such as local officials and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), who want to introduce REDD+ projects in a 
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certain community. However, I argue that these attempts are not sufficient in Vietnam 
due to the insecure land tenure of and unequal forest land allocation to local 
community members. 
 The second question is ‘which factors make a difference between the Nepal 
and Vietnam REDD+ projects?’ Both countries are classified as developing in Asia, 
and are members of both the UN-REDD Programme and the World Bank’s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the two leading institutions of REDD+. 
However, as analyzed later, from the local community perspective, Vietnam is not as 
successful as Nepal in promoting and encouraging community participation, 
especially due to failure in securing community members’ forest and forest resource 
use rights. Investigating both cases will clarify what is necessary and should be 
considered when implementing the projects. There could be several factors: a clear 
land rights definition or effective relationships among actors, such as indigenous 
people, NGOs, and local governments. By analyzing these issues I expect that root 
causes of a lack of community participation in Vietnam will be disclosed. 
 My third issue is ‘how can benefits be distributed equally and equitably in 
the Vietnam and Nepal pilot project areas?’ This issue is a common problem that both 
countries have. One of the major problems of benefit distribution systems (BDS) is 
how to decide who should be paid and how much. Obviously, benefits are one of the 
critical factors that local community members take into account. Therefore, equal and 
equitable benefit distribution is important. Since local community members have to 
limit their use of forest and forest resources and devote their time to meetings or 
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measuring emission reductions, sufficient compensation should be paid. If they find 
that the projects are not beneficial compared to the opportunity costs, it is unlikely 
that they will cooperate with the project implementation. 
1.3. Thesis Statement 
This thesis will argue that community participation in Vietnam is inadequate 
compared to that of Nepal. This is due to top-down policy-making processes by the 
government that lack the consideration of local community members, especially 
indigenous people, and avoid establishing a common understanding of legal land 
rights between the government and indigenous people. Therefore, issues of land 
tenure of indigenous people have existed before REDD+ projects were launched in 
the country, and leaving the preexisting issues complicates the REDD+ 
implementation in terms of community participation.  
1.4. Thesis Structure 
The first chapter contains the background, research questions, and the thesis 
statement. The second chapter includes a review of the theoretical framework 
surrounding REDD+, the history and mechanism of REDD and REDD+, and REDD+ 
and indigenous people. The chapter focuses on the establishment of REDD and 
REDD+ and their internal and external structural problems. The chapter attempts to 
show how REDD+ has been promoted with insufficient development of framework 
and agreements.  
The third and fourth chapters analyze the REDD+ projects in Vietnam and 
Nepal respectively. In Vietnam, land and forest laws do exist, which clarify who owns 
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the land management rights. At the same time, the gap between customary law and 
statutory law, and unequal forest distribution are reported, which discourages active 
participation by people in forests to REDD+. In Nepal, the government legislated 
Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) in the early 1990s, thus facilitating 
community people to manage and control forest use while the land is owned by the 
government. This legislation is said to be successful both in community forest 
management and REDD+ projects. I will analyze how REDD+ in Nepal involves 
CFUGs.  
In the fifth chapter, I develop my comparative analysis. By comparing the 
two countries, the problems that prevent Vietnam from successful implementation of 
REDD+ will be discussed. In the last chapter, I will make some recommendations 
mainly for the REDD+ projects in Vietnam on how to promote community 
participation. 
1.5. Methodology 
This research is based on library research, which includes scholarly articles 
and books about REDD+ projects as well as publications by international 
organizations, NGOs, and governments of Vietnam and Nepal. In the first part of both 
Chapter 3 and 4, I analyzed the documents published by the governments of Vietnam 
and Nepal respectively, international organizations, such as UN-REDD Programme, 
and NGOs. Next, I analyzed scholarly articles that show the outcomes of field 
research conducted in the two countries and NGO reports. By doing this, it became 
possible to find contradictions between the statement of the state governments and the 
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actual implementation on the ground, in terms of protecting local community 
members’ rights on forest and forest land and promoting local participation. 
This research aims to find causes of a lack of community participation in 
REDD+ in Vietnam by exploring how local community members, specifically 
indigenous people who have resided in forest areas for extensive periods of time, are 
involved in REDD+. Also, it aims to find how the state governments consider the 
importance of indigenous people’s participation. In order to provide the holistic 
REDD+ debate at the international level, I discuss how REDD+ was formed and the 
important mechanisms surrounding REDD+, which are carbon markets and Payments 
for Environmental Services (PES). However, because my focus is on REDD+ on the 
ground and not on the mechanisms of REDD+, these topics are briefly discussed. 
Considering my research objectives, to analyze how indigenous people 
participate in REDD+ projects, it would be the best to conduct field research. 
However, because of time limitations, I decided to examine the problems by 
conducting a comparative analysis between Vietnam and Nepal. Even though it was 
hard to locate sources expressing indigenous opinions, I expected that I would be able 
to find the problems faced by REDD+, from indigenous peoples’ perspective by 
analyzing other scholars’ research. The study will help find better ways to implement 
REDD+ by emphasizing the necessity of structural change from a top-down to a 




2. REDD+ in the International Arena 
 This chapter provides literature review about environment and development, 
debates surrounding climate change agendas, and history and concepts of REDD+ at 
the international level as well as REDD+ and indigenous people. In order to discuss 
REDD+, it is important to analyze how the discourse of sustainable development was 
formed, how international debates on climate change have been discussed, and how 
those debates reflect the intention of developed countries. 
Through the chapter, I discuss how REDD+ was formed within the neoliberal 
agendas, which are the commodification of carbon and the intention of developed 
countries to maintain their economic growth, and how it impacts indigenous people in 
developing countries. I argue that since the mechanisms of REDD+ prioritize climate 
change mitigation through carbon trading, it does not consider the livelihoods of 
indigenous people, which possibly leads to the destruction of their inherent culture 
and tradition. 
2.1 Environment and Development 
 Development, which came into the English language in the eighteenth 
century, is used both “descriptively” and “normatively” (Adams 8). Despite its 
complex pedigree, the world had seen the standardization of the meanings of 
development in the second half of the twentieth century. The process of development 
– i.e. “industrialized, urbanized, democratic and capitalist” – re-create the modern 
West across the world (ibid). “[I]t was assumed that rapid industrialization and 
improvement in the material conditions of life could quickly be achieved… by 
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following the formula that had worked in reconstructing war-ravaged Europe” (qtd. in 
Adams 9), and as a result of this assumption, a one-size-fits-all conceptualization of 
development was created (Adams 9).  
 A number of scholars confirm the link between development and 
environment (see Adams 19). Much of human-induced environmental change was 
created under the name of development, and “human-induced environmental change 
arising from development has been mostly negative” (Wilson 3-4). According to 
Gordon Wilson, the problem of development is its unevenness, which means that it 
does not benefit the population equally; it often produces “winners” and “losers” (4). 
In the context of climate change, one of the environmental issues created under the 
name of development, it is poor countries which will be impacted the most by climate 
change. In particular, the poorest people in developing countries are the most 
vulnerable to deteriorating environments due to a lack of equipment to cope with the 
issue (FitzRoy and Papyrakis 64). For example, human-induced climate change 
impacts the most on those who are vulnerable to environmental change, such as 
forest-dependent people in low income developing countries. This is because climate 
change produces effects like forest fires due to reduced rainfall and increased 
frequency of droughts. The forest-dependent people rely on their livelihoods on 
forests and forest resources, but ironically, those who need forests the most often do 





2.2. Sustainable Development 
 The term ‘sustainability’ has been one of the most popular terms in the 
environmental discourse for the last three decades. The first international-level forum 
that sustainable development was brought into was the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 (Adams 59). After the 
Conference, the sustainable development debate began to be influenced by concerns 
about poverty in the developing world (64). The first document that codified 
sustainable development for the first time is The World Conservation Strategy (WCS) 
in 1980, and the term was further developed through the Brundtland Report, Our 
Common Future (59). The most common definition of sustainable development is 
provided by Our Common Future: “…development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (Brundtland and WCED 43). 
 Our Common Future was followed by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio in 1992 (Rio Conference) (FitzRoy and 
Papyrakis 46). Kathleen McAfee argues that those who promoted the Conference, 
such as the conservationists and policymakers, “had added ‘Development’ to the title” 
in order to “win the support of global-South countries” (242). As a result, William 
Adams states that Agenda 21, which was adopted at the Rio Conference, “…bears the 
strong inheritance of its predecessors,” such as its emphasis on economic growth as a 
crucial factor of sustainable development (94). Indeed, the World Bank Environment 
Department officials emphasized the importance of applying the experiences of 
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growth and development by industrialized countries (Isla 21). This means the 
continuous existence of the conflicting concepts of economic growth and 
environmental conservation. Economic development is most likely to be harmful to 
the environment and induce environmental degradation, yet international agenda on 
climate change, which was led by developed countries, prioritized their economic 
growth rather than compromising it. 
 Sustainable development concerns both the limited environmental resources 
and robust economic growth. FitzRoy and Papyrakis argue that “sustainable 
development addresses concerns about the feasibility of continuous economic 
development on a planet of limited resources and fragile ecosystems” (45). Ana Isla 
states that “[t]he idea of sustainable development is that there must be an exchange 
process between those with money to buy and those with natural capital to sell” (22). 
These hold the idea of neoliberalism. David Harvey defines that neoliberalism is:  
A theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-
being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private 
property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices (22). 
The neoliberal political economy was applied to nature after the recognition of the 
ecological crisis (Isla 20). The international conferences on sustainable development 
were processed under the neoliberal dominance. The ideas of sustainable development 
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were formed, but its definition is ambiguous, which leads to the different 
understanding among different actors (Adams 6-7). The ambiguity of the definition 
causes a different understanding by different actors, such as environmentalists, 
politicians, and business leaders. The result is that sustainable development for 
business elites ends up “making our business sustainable,” which results in the 
continuation of ‘business-as-usual’ (ibid).  
 Arturo Escobar agrees with Adams. Escobar argues that in the discourse of 
sustainable development, the Western-centric ideas that “the benevolent (white) hand 
of the West will save the Earth” (Escobar 193) clearly exist. This discourse ignores 
the Third World, which is also influenced by unsustainable economic activities, and 
establishes sustainable development as the issue that should be managed by the 
Western way. Moreover, Escobar argues that nature is no longer external, but internal 
to capital: nature “become[s] stocks of capital” (199). Sustainable development 
contains the emphasis on economic growth and the neoliberal – and also Western – 
idea that considers nature as commodity. The international level decisions on 
sustainable development are dominated by developed countries that intend to force 
the burden of environmental degradation caused by economic activities of developed 
countries on developing countries. Climate change debates have this characteristic. As 
shown later, in carbon markets, which are one of the tools to promote GHG emissions 
reductions to mitigate climate change, the Western intention is clearly reflected. 
REDD+, which aims to provide opportunities to developing countries to get benefits 
from joining into carbon markets by avoiding deforestation and forest degradation, 
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contains a neoliberal idea of looking at nature as commodity. Furthermore, it 
emphasizes benefits and lacks consideration to the livelihoods and social situations of 
indigenous people. Their rights are not always secured by law in terms of land tenure, 
and they are often marginalized economically and socially, which ultimately causes a 
lack of protection by the state governments. Therefore, the very nature of neoliberal 
characteristics of REDD+ is not beneficial but harmful to indigenous people. 
2.3. The Myth of Participatory Development 
 As mentioned, the REDD+ projects will distribute rewards to those who 
cooperate with the projects and successfully reduce CO2 emissions from avoiding 
deforestation and forest degradation, and the community members’ use of forest and 
forest resources will be limited. “Community” participation is promoted in the 
projects, which Ilan Kapoor argues is a trend in development programs. Kapoor states 
that Participatory Development (PD) represents “a more inclusive and ‘bottom-up’ 
politics” (1203), which mainly takes two institutional forms. First is Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA), of which objective is to empower local communities. Second 
is “country ‘ownership’ of development programmes,” which means that the state or 
international agency promote the involvement of civil society for policy making 
(ibid).  
However, PD reflects the Western complicity and desire (Kapoor 1204). PD, 
which is supposed to be for the locals, contains the Western idea that the West helps 
the Third World and the West is more knowledgeable than the Third World, which 
forms the thought that PD is implemented “with a clear conscience” (1206). 
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Participation is a trend, and more importantly, it is an institutional brand, which makes 
PD essential in the development community due to its marketability and 
fashionability (1211-12). Western organizations that promote PD are able to get 
support from the public by appealing its participatory approach in their development 
activities.  
Another merit of promoting PD is that it can emphasize the Western 
organizations intention to protect human rights by diverting to bottom-up approach 
from conventional top-down approach in local development. However, consequently, 
the Western intention is still clearly reflected to PD in the Third World. Moreover, 
Kapoor argues that PD may strengthen the patriarchal structure (1203-04). This is 
crucial because this implies that objectives of elites in local communities decide PD 
programs, which possibly end up disregarding of other community members’ 
opinions.  
 The absence of community members in PD programs is discussed by other 
authors. Citing Nelson and Wright, Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke state that 
“community” is conceptualized by states and organizations, not the people themselves 
(253). This leads us to consider “community” as homogenous, which is not applicable 
since “community” is an aggregate of people from different genders, races, social 
hierarchies, and so on. Consensus possibly strengthens the already powerful elites’ 
interests (253). PD is intended to promote every community member’s participation, 
but the consensus often does not reflect opinions of marginalized people. This is a 
critical failure of PD and it reveals the First World’s lack of consideration about the 
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structure within communities. Escobar’s critique against development helps to 
understand the failure of PD. He states that: 
Development was – and continues to be for the most part – a top-down, 
ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and 
cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and 
down in the charts of “progress.” Development was conceived not as a 
cultural process… but instead as a system of more or less universally 
applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some “badly 
needed” goods to a “target” population. It comes as no surprise that 
development became a force so destructive to Third World cultures, 
ironically in the name of people’s interests (44). 
The First World carries out PD in the Third World under the name of ‘benevolence’. 
However, there is a threat of manipulation by the First World of local communities in 
the Third World and the ignorance of people who have power due to its view of 
‘community’ as concept and not substantial existence. 
 How does this relate to REDD+? The approach of REDD+ applies PD. It 
strongly reflects the desire of the First World to utilize carbon markets to allow itself 
to emit more GHG for their economy. Furthermore, through introducing REDD+ 
projects to local communities in the Third World, the First World’s intention 
penetrates the communities without respecting indigenous knowledge of forests and 
forest resources. This is destructive to the traditions and cultures of the communities. 
It is no wonder that REDD+ has negative impacts on indigenous people since it 
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prioritizes how to benefit from carbon markets rather than helping indigenous people. 
2.4. Carbon Markets 
2.4.1. The Kyoto Protocol 
 One of the most famous agreements on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation is the Kyoto Protocol, agreed in 1997. The Protocol was agreed at the 
Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 3), with the ratification by 192 
parties (191 States and 1 regional economic integration organization) (UNFCCC 
“Status of Ratification”). It is the first international agreement that attempts to 
mitigate climate change through GHG emissions reductions, and the first to employ 
the flexible global markets to global environmental management (Dumanski 257). 
The Conference recognized that developed countries are mainly responsible for GHG 
emissions due to their industrial activities, and the Protocol imposed a heavier burden 
on developed countries under the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (UNFCCC “Kyoto Protocol”). Developed countries were categorized 
as Annex I countries, and they agreed to reduce GHG emissions as a whole by at least 
5% during 2008-2012 (Dumanski 258). However, the objective of the reduction is 
insufficient. The failure of the Kyoto Protocol includes that it did not impose 
reduction obligation on developing countries including China and India that already 
emitted a great deal of GHG, the United States, the largest emitter of GHG, did not 
ratify it.  
Furthermore, the insufficiency reflects the hardship of reaching an 
international agreement with all participants’ strong motivation. At COP 3, both 
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developing countries and developed countries, except a few of them, were reluctant to 
take a strong action against carbon emissions, because no country was willing to 
sacrifice its economic development for the environment (FitzRoy and Papyrakis 106). 
Moreover, developing countries were not convinced to limit their economic activities 
to reduce GHG emissions since it is developed countries which should own the 
responsibilities. In addition, a country can easily change its priority to economic 
growth, rather than to protect the environment, as “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
effectively indicates. Garrett Hardin argues that common lands that are open to 
everyone will ultimately be destroyed due to the insufficient management. Hardin 
states that if a pasture is open to all, it is expected that every herdsman tries to keep 
cattle as much as possible. The result is that it causes a overgrazing in a limited 
pasture, which ultimately results in a ruin of all land (Hardin 1244). Climate change 
can be explained in this argument. Since there is no concrete property right over 
atmosphere, each country emits GHG to try to maximize their benefits rather than 
protect the environment. Consequently, countries shift the responsibility to each other, 
and global warming continues to proceed. 
 The Kyoto Protocol introduced three facilitating mechanisms, which are: 
Joint Implementation (JI); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); and 
International Emissions Trading (IET). JI and IET are the mechanisms made for 
developed countries to achieve their reduction targets, whereas the CDM is both for 
developed and developing countries. In this thesis, the CDM will be discussed since it 
relates more on developing countries, and thus REDD+ projects. 
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2.4.2. The Clean Development Mechanism 
 The CDM projects are made to assist developing countries to achieve 
sustainable development by receiving investment from developed countries (Biswas 
6). Also, the mechanism allows that the governments or private parties of developed 
countries to get the benefit in terms of Certified Emission Reductions (CER), carbon 
credits that can be credited against their emission reduction targets through investing 
in emission reduction projects in developing countries (1). Therefore, the mechanism 
is argued to be a ‘win-win’ system for developed and developing countries. However, 
the CDM has been so controversial that even among developing countries, which 
have undertaken emission reduction projects, views were divided when it was 
introduced. Some countries concerned about land use rights when carbon sinks, offset 
from carbon sequestration by trees, were included, while others looked at the 
possibility that would bring about resources and investment in the forestry sector 
(Guitiérrez 639, 644). For example, many countries in Latin America and Africa 
showed interest since sinks can be a source of income (ibid.). 
However, in reality, it can be explained as a tool created by developed 
countries to integrate developing countries “into the global carbon market primarily as 
producers and sellers” of carbon credits, “intended to aid Northern countries in 
meeting their mandated reductions” (Ervine 653). In fact, Tienhaara states that even 
though carbon projects are supposed to be ‘win-win’, many of them “have resulted in 
the displacement of local populations or the reduction or elimination of the ability of 
forest-dependent communities to access crucial resources” in developing countries 
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(552). The Kyoto Protocol recognized that the main carbon emitter has been 
developed countries, but it is developed countries who have power to determine the 
global actions to mitigate or adapt to climate change. As a result, threats of climate 
change that should be seen as the ecological impacts on the most vulnerable 
stakeholders, developing countries, have been treated as economic threats to 
developed countries (Ervine 656). The CDM was created under this background, 
which necessarily has led to the Mechanism to be neoliberal. 
 Another issue surrounding the CDM is the complexity of the mechanism. 
The UNFCCC reached an agreement about the rules and procedures on how to govern 
the new market in emission reduction credits, but Guitiérrez states that the delegates 
“had created a scheme that even they could hardly understand” (640). Not only the 
scheme but also how to calculate carbon emission is problematic. Many scholars 
found it impossible to accurately calculate how much carbon is sequestered in a 
specific land-use or industrial technology intervention (McAfee 245). There are four 
main issues of the CDM from the perspective of carbon sequestration: baseline, 
additionality, leakage, and permanence. 
Baseline is the existing situation of carbon one would expect under business 
as usual conditions without any carbon policies or projects (Murray, Sohngen, and 
Ross 136). To establish a reliable baseline is essential, but this depends largely on the 
stakeholders’ interests due to the fact that there is no way to prove the actual baseline 
since it is a hypothesis. This means that possibly, the baseline was set higher than the 
actual emissions level, which would generate more credits than the actual credits that 
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one is supposed to get. 
Additionality relates to baseline. It is the indication that demonstrates the 
projects cannot be realized without CDM. Project proponents have to show the 
proposed measures reduce emissions, and exclude those would have been introduced 
without CDM (Biswas 17). To prove additionality, which is a significant measure for 
projects to be confirmed, is complex and difficult.  
Another problem is leakage. Leakage means that as a result of a certain 
project, unexpected GHG emissions occur at or are shifted to the outside of the 
boundary of the project (Murray, Sohngen, and Ross 132). Even though a project 
successfully reduces GHG emissions, it ends up a failure if the emissions of outside of 
the boundary have increased. Therefore, how to prevent emissions from outside of the 
boundary is crucial.  
The last issue is permanence. GHG emissions that were successfully reduced 
should be stored permanently and not be re-emitted in the air (Murray, Sohngen, and 
Ross 129). However, it possibly happens that the sequestered emissions are re-
emitted, which means a project failed to reduce emissions.  
These are the problems of the CDM. The debates surrounding the CDM and 
carbon markets are complicated. The North-South relationship, the differences in 
ideas among developing countries, the private sector, NGOs, and local communities – 
are all involved in the mechanism. The views are different even within same groups. 
Some consider that markets are, at least potentially, efficient and fair. Others argue 
that markets are necessarily inequitable (McAfee 251). REDD+ has the same 
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problems as the CDM. I would like to emphasize that the REDD+ projects have been 
carried out even though they have a number of problems as above. Marketing GHG 
emissions is not easy, though developed countries continue to pursue it under the 
name of climate change mitigation. 
2.5. Payments for Environmental Services  
 Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is a mechanism that attempts to 
reward farmers or landowners who have agreed to take action to manage their land for 
environmental services they provide (IIED; Petheram and Campbell 369). PES should 
be transferred from the beneficiaries of certain environmental services to the 
providers (Mayrand and Paquin 1). Even though there is no universal definition of 
PES (5), Sven Wunder defines five criteria of PES. They are: “a voluntary 
transaction”; “a well-defined environmental service”; at least one buyer; at least one 
provider; and the continuous provision of the service by the provider (Wunder 50). 
Lisa Petheram and Bruce Campbell, and Sango Mahanty, Helen Suich, and Luca 
Tacconi acknowledge that many researchers agree with Wunder’s PES criteria 
(Mahanty, Suich, and Tacconi 39); however, they argue that PES schemes do not meet 
every criterion nor is PES that simple in reality (Petheram and Campbell 369).  
 PES schemes are designed to correct the market failure of considering 
environmental services by internalizing benefits and creating incentives for provision 
of them (Mayrand and Paquin 2). Karel Mayrand and Marc Paquin mention the 
necessity of protecting marginalized people and suggest strategies to this end (37-38), 
but they fail to indicate how to improve the current challenges that PES schemes 
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have. One of the challenges, for example, relates to the ownership of the land. Pham 
Thu Thuy analyzed several PES schemes in Vietnam and reports that it is difficult for 
poor people to obtain land use right certificates due to the time-consuming processes 
and the necessity to pay informal money to the head of the commune and village for 
permission to obtain the certificates (389). Moreover, Petheram and Campbell argue 
that although the schemes are promoted as a “win-win” solution for conservation and 
development, few examples of successful schemes are reported, and whereas they are 
supposed to replace top-down approaches to natural resource management, they 
remain one-way (369-70). PES is a market-based mechanism, and it tends to remain 
unsuccessful in protecting minorities’ rights to benefits. 
How does PES connect to REDD+? Mahanty, Suich and Tacconi argue that 
“PES has emerged as a likely mechanism to link national level REDD+ payments to 
sub-national resource management activities” (39). Randy Bluffstone, Elizabeth 
Robinson, and Paul Guthiga state that “REDD+ at its core is an example of a system 
that provides payments for environmental services” (44). In order to make PES 
scheme effectively be implemented on all private, state, and communal lands, rights 
of land use need to be formally recognized (Mahanty, Suich and Tacconi 45). 
However, at the same time, it would be costly in terms of finance and labor for 
participants when introducing PES schemes (42), which could be more expensive than 
the returns. In fact, Mahanty, Suich and Tacconi analyzed seven PES schemes and 
found that all of them had significant up-front costs, such as for introducing new land 
management practices and for tree planting. Furthermore, local people are not 
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provided sufficient information by the beneficiaries, which leads to misunderstanding 
of concepts and rules by local people (ibid). PES schemes are seemingly applicable to 
REDD+ projects, but in terms of local participation, sufficient information as well as 
land use rights protection is essential. These conditions are often found to be difficult 
to achieve.  
2.6. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
2.6.1. History of REDD 
 In this section, I will analyze the establishment of REDD. REDD was, as 
mentioned, established to allow developing countries to enter carbon markets through 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Why do forests matter? 
Forests covered 31% of the total land area of the earth in 2010, and about 13 million 
hectares of forests had been changed to other uses, such as agriculture, every year 
from 2000 to 2010 (FAO Global Forest Resources 10). Indeed, forests stock more 
than 650 billion tons of carbon, which is more than the entire atmosphere does (11). 
Because of this, degradation and deforestation of the world’s tropical forests 
contributes to 10% of net global carbon emissions (REDD Desk “What is REDD+?”). 
The importance of forests is not only as a climate change mitigation tool but also as a 
means of conservation of biodiversity and protection of the livelihoods of forest 
dependent people (ibid). Therefore, protecting forests from deforestation and forest 
degradation is crucial in multiple dimensions. 
 As mentioned above, the Kyoto Protocol did not provide financial incentives 
to developing countries to reduce deforestation. Furthermore, the Protocol considered 
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that only afforestation and reforestation activities were eligible for generating carbon 
credits under CDM. This was succeeded to the Marrakesh Accords under COP 7 
(REDD Desk “What is REDD+?”). Under this circumstance, the agenda “Reducing 
emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate 
action” was first introduced at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005. The governments of 
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica submitted a proposal including the conception of 
REDD, aiming that developing countries enter carbon markets by generating credits 
from reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD Desk “What is REDD+?”). The 
proposal states that the Marrakesh Accords (which were agreed upon at COP 7) 
include crediting afforestation and reforestation activities, but do not refer to reducing 
emissions from tropical deforestation. Tropical deforestation is the largest factor of 
emissions in the developing world (PNG and CR 8). The proposal was supported by 
other members of COP. This was the starting point of REDD, which came to attract 
international attention.  
In 2007, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) of the UNFCCC suggested a draft decision policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to REDD+, which was further discussed at COP 13 in 
2007 (Thompson, Baruah, and Carr 101). Taking over the recommendation by the 
SBSTA, COP 13 adopted the Bali Action Plan (Visseren-Hamakers and Verkooijen 
137). The Bali Action Plan recognized that the parties mitigate climate change at the 
national and international levels by considering policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues about REDD, and the role of conservation, sustainable 
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management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries (UNFCCC COP 3). However, the Plan did not provide a precise definition 
of demonstration activities (IGES 6). The inclusion of the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forest, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks reflects 
the consideration toward countries such as China and India, which had already 
succeeded in reducing deforestation rates and demanded financial rewards for forest 
conservation. This was the birth of the concept of REDD+. In the next section, the 
history of REDD+ from its birth to present will be discussed. 
2.6.2. History of REDD+ 
The mandate of REDD has been extended to include conservation, 
sustainable forest management and enhancing carbon stocks in developing countries. 
The debate on REDD+ was further promoted with increasing interests both at 
international and national levels. COP 15 in Copenhagen decided the methodological 
guidance for activities relating to REDD+ (UNFCCC, Key Decisions 6). COP 16 in 
Cancún in 2010 was especially important for the REDD+ negotiations because of the 
decisions made (Denier et al. 24; IGES 4). At the conference, the parties decided on a 
phased approach to REDD+ implementation (Denier et al. 24). 
Furthermore, the Decision 1/CP.16 requested developing countries that were 
interested in REDD+ to develop a national strategy, a national forest reference 
emission level, an adequate national forest monitoring system, an information 
providing system regarding the safeguards, and consideration to the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People (IGES 4-5; Allan and Dauvergne 1314). In the 
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agreement, it includes “the most comprehensive package ever agreed by 
governments” that was intended to support developing countries tackling climate 
change, and ultimately, to achieve low emission economies (UNFCCC “Milestones”).  
 The REDD+ debate was further continued at COP 17 in Durban in 2011 by 
agreeing that developing countries update their forest reference emission level and/or 
forest reference level periodically. Moreover, the parties agreed to provide 
information on safeguards through national communications (IGES 5). Also, financial 
planning including market credits and creating intergovernmental funds were 
discussed. This Conference accepted market-based mechanisms for the first time by 
deciding to raise funds from both private and public organizations (Allan and 
Dauvergne 1315). At COP 19 in Warsaw in 2013, the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ 
(which is a set of new decisions under discussion until then) was approved. The 
decisions were the requirements to developing countries (Denier et al. 25), and the 
core decisions are to “provide guidance to ensure real, long-term emissions reductions 
from REDD+ activities, the foundations for transparency and integrity of REDD+ 
actions, and clarify ways to finance relevant activities and improve the coordination 
of support” (IGES 5). The decision was crucial as both developed and developing 
countries reached the agreements to further promote and establish solid rules of 
REDD+. To date, the framework of REDD+ is still under discussion and has yet to be 
solidified. There are a number of challenges that REDD+ faces, including how to 




2.6.3. Concepts of REDD+ 
The Kyoto Protocol excluded emissions reductions by avoiding deforestation 
from its carbon accounting and trading scheme. The main objective of REDD+ can be 
defined as to provide positive financial incentives to developing countries to reduce 
emissions by avoiding deforestation and forest degradation, and to provide 
performance-based compensation to these countries (Brockhaus, Gregorio, and 
Mardiah 1; McDermott et al. 64; Pistorius 638). Therefore, the basic economics is 
“simple” (Maraseni et al. 37). In other words, REDD+ is the mechanism that provides 
opportunities for developing countries to get carbon credits by avoiding cutting trees, 
which is regarded as ‘avoiding deforestation’, and sell the credits to international 
carbon markets. The carbon credits are, however, mainly sold in the voluntary carbon 
markets (Carbon Trade Watch), and it is voluntary and not a part of a legally-binding 
global agreement. REDD+ was expected to be beneficial as it was a cost-efficient 
scheme to decrease emissions when first introduced (Visseren-Hamakers and 
Verkooijen 137). Moreover, the ‘plus’ part “also enhanced the potential for REDD+ to 
achieve co-benefits such as poverty alleviation, improved governance, biodiversity 
conservation, and protection of ecosystem services” (Denier et al. 24) when it was 
declared at COP 15.  
In theory, market-based REDD+ would solve conflicts among developed 
countries and developing countries regarding the relative responsibilities on global 
warming (McAfee 238). However, as the international debate continued, REDD+ 
activities on the ground became more complex than the original idea of the 
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compensation mechanism. Also, many stakeholders were disappointed with the 
negotiations since “the modalities for participation in the compensation mechanism 
are still unclear and the compensation payments remain out of sight” (Pistorius 638). 
As a result, the REDD+ framework is yet to be concreted. Furthermore, stakeholders 
not only include international organizations, state governments, and forest-dependent 
people, but also environmental NGOs and the private sector since REDD+ accepts 
funding from private investors, make the debate complicated due to their different 
intentions and understanding about REDD+ implementation.  
Mary Thompson, Manali Baruah, and Edward Carr argue that REDD+ is 
functioning as a form of governance by conceptualizing governance as “a set of social 
norms and political assumptions that will steer societies and organizations in a manner 
that shapes collective decisions about the use and management of forest resources” 
(100). Joanna Cabello and Tamra Gilbertson further argue that the framing “comes 
largely from international bodies seeking technical and market fixes” and it ignores 
the restructuring of the very foundation that created the issue of the market-oriented 
REDD+ framework (164). The authors argue that the international climate change 
agenda is manipulated by neoliberal and corporate-friendly ideas (ibid), which put 
more emphasis on how to benefit from carbon markets. Under the REDD+ scheme, 
forests, which are the basis of indigenous people’s livelihoods, are commoditized, and 
considered as the objects that humans dominate for economic profits (163). As a 
result, REDD+ indirectly allows the oppression on the South by the North, which is 
regarded as an example of carbon colonialism (Nielsen 274).  
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Another crucial point is suggested by McAfee. Noting that this is less often 
acknowledged, the author argues that inequality between the North and the South is 
built into the framework of carbon trading. This is because offset credits can be gotten 
cheaper in economically poorer regions since opportunity costs are smaller where 
labor and land are cheaper; “investment in greening in the global South is 
economically ‘efficient’ because nature and human lives are cheaper” (McAfee 246). 
This is problematic because the framework supposing inequality between the North 
and the South may ultimately cause the persistent unequal power structure between 
the two, at least in terms of carbon trading, and the exploitation of people and nature 
in the South. 
I discussed in the previous section that the Kyoto Protocol and CDM have 
neoliberal characteristics in their mechanisms. In addition to the two crucial 
arrangements on climate change, REDD+ allows commercial logging operations in 
old-growth forests and territories of forest-dependent people, including indigenous 
people, under the name of sustainable forest management (Cabello and Gilbertson 
166). In fact, Anne Larson argues that the priority of REDD+ is not on poverty-
alleviation, which is said to be one of the merits of REDD+, but on climate-change 
mitigation, and the needs of poor people in forests are not believed to be as important 
as how to reduce carbon emissions (541). Even though the original idea was generated 
by the two developing countries, the framework reflects the intentions of 
industrialized countries more than those of developing countries. The framework of 
REDD+ has been formed by developed countries to allow them to emit more carbon 
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by transferring emissions reductions efforts to developing countries, particularly 
forest-dependent people and indigenous people living in local communities. The 
neoliberal nature of REDD+ does no good but harm to those people as it 
commoditizes carbon, hence forests in local communities, without taking into account 
their livelihoods and culture and tradition. 
2.6.4. Mechanism and Benefit Distribution 
 In this section, the general procedures of REDD+ implementation and its 
finance will be discussed. As mentioned, the final agreement of the REDD+ 
mechanism has not been reached yet, so in order to implement REDD+, participant 
countries have to undertake activities based on a phased approach. The United 
Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Programme) sets out the 
three phases in the report, The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015, as 
follows: 
 Phase [I]: Development of national strategies or action plans, policies and 
measures, and capacity building  
 Phase [II]: Implementation of national policies and measures and national 
strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity building, 
technology, development and transfer, and results-based demonstration 
activities  
 Phase [III]: Results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported 
and verified (3) 
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For example, Vietnam finished the first phase of REDD+ readiness in 2012. Phase I in 
Vietnam focused on a pilot project in Lam Dong Province, Free Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) initiatives, and how the private sector would participate (Tran and 
Bayrak 110). At the time when the second phase started in December 2012, which 
was the first to launch the phase, the pilot projects were implemented in six provinces. 
Phase II also included the establishment of a Measurement, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) system, mainstreaming REDD+ into national and regional 
planning, consulting with the forest-dependent people on implementation and the 
benefits, and afforestation and reforestation activities. Phase II will continue for three 
years (110-11).  
To achieve REDD+ successfully, adequate, predictable, and sustainable 
finance of REDD+ is fundamental (GCP 68). Globally, REDD+ accepts funds from 
public, private, national and international sources as well as different revenue 
mechanisms such as taxes and carbon markets (Streck and Parker 116). Almost 90% 
of REDD+ finance was provided by the public sector. Bilateral funds manage more 
than half of finances pledged since 2006, whereas the multilateral funds, including the 
UN-REDD Programme and the FCPF, cover one-third of the funds (Norman and 
Nakhooda 2). For example, the UN-REDD Programme has raised USD 245 million 
from donor countries, such as Norway, between 2008 and 2014 (UN-REDD Progress 
Report 45). 21 countries pledged almost 5 billion USD through bilateral agreements 
between 2006 and 2014 (5). The private sector is expected to participate in REDD+ 
finance more actively; however, the current policies do not provide sufficient 
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incentives for the private sector to invest in REDD+ (Streck and Parker 118). The 
funds are mainly disbursed to “readiness activities such as capacity building, training 
workshops, strengthening in-county institutions and developing national REDD+ 
policies and strategies” to the REDD+-implementing countries and NGOs (qtd. in 
Norman and Nakhooda 26).  
An important thing in REDD+ finance is a benefit distribution to local 
community members. However, currently, a great amount of the funds is used in 
preparation of the projects. Approximately 40% of the total public funding is 
channeled as ex-post payments on performance, but the great portion of the payments 
is likely to be used in readiness activities (Norman and Nakhooda 2). It is crucial to 
ensure that the payments for reduced emissions reward those who implement the 
projects. Also, a mutual understanding within a developing country in a vertical 
relationship, which means the relationship among national, regional, and communal 
levels, is essential for establishing the necessary financial institutions and decisions. 
Financial assistance would be a strong motivation for developing countries and 
implementers of REDD+ projects. Therefore, the financial issues have to be treated as 
an urgent topic. 
2.7. REDD+ and Development 
2.7.1. REDD+ and Indigenous People’s Rights 
The thesis has suggested that REDD+ has negative impacts on indigenous 
people’s rights. REDD+ restricts indigenous people’s use of forest resources, which 
the people consume as firewood, fodder, and other Non-Timber Forest Products 
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(NTFPs). This limitation directly impacts the people’s livelihoods, and therefore, their 
compensation for the loss is absolutely necessary. However, the compensation is said 
to be inadequate. Bhaskar S. Karky and Golam Rasul analyzed the potential for 
benefits before Nepal implemented the REDD+ projects. The authors calculated three 
patterns of activities: business as usual, business as usual plus carbon management, 
and carbon management only. Business as usual here means that “communities 
manage their forest for meeting their subsistence needs” (Karky and Rasul 111). The 
authors found that carbon management without normal activities would be the most 
costly (115). If the cost would be more than the benefit, there would be no motivation 
for indigenous people to carry out the projects.  
Clarifying and strengthening land tenure can contribute to reduce deforestation 
and forest degradation. Researchers argue that tenure insecurity induces forest 
clearing, unauthorized land use, and land grabbing, and states that secure tenure can 
lead to forest conservation and investment in forests (Larson, Brockhaus, and 
Sunderlin 155-156). Regarding these arguments, it is clear that secured tenure will 
contribute to the implementation of REDD+ in terms of promoting reduction of 
deforestation and forest degradation, and securing tenure itself can protect the 
livelihoods of indigenous people. However, protecting land tenure is often difficult, 
especially in developing countries, which tend to lack necessary regulations. William 
D. Sunderlin et al. examined REDD+ and land tenure issues in Brazil, Cameroon, 
Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Stating that people tended to have overlapping and 
insecure forest tenure in developing countries, they found that every country above 
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had some problems with the land rights of indigenous people at different levels. The 
authors cite land competition, conflict, ease of revoking rights, and a lack of right to 
exclude outsiders (Sunderlin et al. 40-41).  
In addition to the land tenure issues, indigenous people are often not fully 
informed about carbon rights. An incident representing the issue of a lack of 
information held by indigenous people occurred in Papua New Guinea. There, 
landowners have strong rights to their land, and the vast majority of the lands and 
forests are customarily owned (Leggett and Lovell 120). However, due to landowners’ 
lack of awareness of their rights, questionable carbon project developers called 
‘carbon cowboys’ appeared, and landowners started signing over carbon rights to 
them. The landowners were not aware of the implication of what they were doing, and 
signed without knowing any legal framework within which to do it. This incident 
attracted media interests and was reported widely in Papua New Guinea in 2008 and 
2009 (Larson et al. 680). Indigenous people often do not have proper access to 
information. What is worse is that they do not realize that they do not have adequate 
information, and thus it is easy for outsiders or even government officials to take 
advantage of their ignorance. 
2.7.2. REDD+ and Community Participation 
 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines 
participatory forestry as “processes and mechanisms which enable people with a 
direct stake in forest resources to be part of decision-making in all aspects of forest 
management, including policy formulation processes” (FAO). Community 
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participation in forest management requires members’ involvement and legal rights to 
be involved in forest management activities as well as their involvement in decision-
making processes (Suharti 233). Not only are physical contributions by communities 
such as labor and cash considered important, initiative is also included in the concept 
of community participation (237). Also, community participation is crucial to get 
benefits from REDD+ projects so that local community members are not excluded 
from the benefit distribution. In addition to their involvement in decision-making 
processes, their participation in forest monitoring is important in REDD+. The 
effectiveness of community participation in REDD+ is confirmed by scholars. The 
first quantitative research of REDD+ community participation was conducted in 2013. 
The research found that half of the official REDD+ projects did not engage local 
communities in monitoring activities, but communities successfully produced forest 
monitoring data, which was accurate, legitimate, and cost-effective (Langford 2013). 
This suggests the potential usefulness of a community as an official unit of a project 
implementer, which has been a topic in international debate but has yet to be 
solidified. 
The involvement of local communities and indigenous people into REDD+ 
means the necessity of protecting rights and benefits of them. In order to get 
indigenous people involved in REDD+ projects, providing them with sufficient 
information is essential. Max Ooft argues that the rights and participation of 
indigenous people have to be taken into account more seriously in forest management 
policies (21), which is often stipulated, but not always applied (23). This applies to 
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REDD+ projects. Even though international level discussions often take indigenous 
people’s right protection seriously, it has yet to be achieved on the ground. 
In fact, indigenous people and other local community members do not 
necessarily welcome REDD+ projects in their territories. Coalitions of indigenous 
groups have condemned REDD+ as “cover for a new phase of land enclosure and 
dispossession of the poor” (qtd. in McAfee 239). Also, some scholars argue that 
REDD+ enables states to recentralize their control over land and resources (McAfee 
244). As a result, Anti-REDD+ movements are being held by indigenous people in 
many areas. The ‘No rights no REDD’ movement condemned climate negotiations as 
it failed to secure a binding commitment to indigenous people’s rights and safeguards 
(Larson et al. 679). However, Cabello and Gilbertson argue that the voices of the 
people who are directly affected by REDD+ are silenced (162). As long as the rights 
of indigenous people on their land are insecure and safeguards are not established, 
REDD+ remains harmful to them. Even though the international level discussions on 
REDD+ recognize the necessity to protect the rights of indigenous people and other 
forest-dependent people, the issue is not taken seriously since REDD+ is one of the 
mechanisms that allows developed countries the continuous economic growth by 
shifting their emission reduction responsibilities to developing countries. 
2.8. REDD+ and Community Forest Management (CFM) 
Community forest management (CFM) is the concept that “refers broadly to 
forest use and governance arrangement under which the rights, responsibilities, and 
authority for forest management rest, at least in part, with local communities” 
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(Newton et al. 27). CFM has been proved to contribute to reducing the rate of 
deforestation (31) and poverty alleviation (Neupane and Shrestha 78). There are three 
reasons why CFM discussion is worth considering in the context of REDD+. First is 
its importance in developing countries; about 25% of forests are controlled by 
communities. Second, community-controlled forests (CCFs) are substantial for people 
in rural area in developing countries, but they have failed to fully realize the value of 
forests, and forests end up being converted to other uses. Third, households are 
dependent on forests for their livelihoods, such as use of fuelwood, forest fruits and 
vegetables, and fodder (Bluffstone, Robinson, and Guthiga 44). One of the 
characteristics of REDD+ is its requirement of involving local communities, and 
considering the number of CFM areas and local communities’ contribution to forest 
management, to utilize CFM will be effective for REDD+ projects. 
 In most developing countries, forests have been owned by governments. 
However, in Nepal, for example, the state government found it impossible to 
adequately control forests due to a lack of funds for monitoring and regulating the 
people, which caused the deforestation and forest deterioration (Bluffstone, Robinson, 
and Guthiga 45). This is because the people did not have a sense of ownership and 
regarded the land as open access. The state government decided to decentralize the 
forest management and control rights. This is how CFM has been launched in Nepal. 
In general, CCFs can be categorized between private property and state property. This 
is because while communities are entitled by the government to manage forests, 
forests are still owned by the government (ibid). Therefore, CCFs are not completely 
47 
 
the property of communities although they do manage and base their livelihoods on 
CCFs.  
 There are several reasons why CFM is attractive for REDD+ project 
proponents: CCFs are in a relatively good condition; community people know how to 
manage forests with interacting government officials, civil society organizations, and 
projects; and the institutional capacity for implementation is ready (Newton et al. 33-
34). In other words, CFM has “a sound framework” that REDD+ can utilize to 
provide financial and livelihood benefits to the communities that manage forests 
(Bluffstone, Robinson, and Guthiga 48). A trend of utilizing CCFs for REDD+ 
implementation may accelerate the increase of projects in developing countries.  
However, at the same time, this means that there is a risk that REDD+ may 
rely on CFM areas for easy and quick implementation. Problems may occur if 
REDD+ fails to establish adequate safeguards on indigenous people’s livelihoods and 
benefit distribution system while imposing costs on them. Also, it could restrict 
traditional forest resource use of forest-dependent communities, which may be 
destructive to ecological and socioeconomic equilibrium (Newton et al. 28) that has 
been fostered in the communities. Moreover, REDD+ may result in re-centralization 
of forest control (Bluffstone, Robinson, and Guthiga 47) due to its funding 
mechanisms. CCFs account for 25% of all forest areas in developing countries, but 
this is only a portion of the total forest areas. In the long term, REDD+ is required to 
establish a framework that is adaptable to every forest management type regardless of 
whether strong CFM systems exist or not.  
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 In summary, I argued in this chapter that REDD+ and its surrounding 
frameworks reflect the intention of developed countries to emit carbon for their 
economic growth. This is shown in how the Kyoto Protocol and carbon markets were 
formed. In terms of REDD+, developed countries tries to get carbon credits by 
limiting forest and forest resource use of forest-dependent people in developing 
countries, without considering their livelihoods. Despite movements against REDD+ 
by indigenous people, their voices remain silenced by those who seek to benefit from 
REDD+. In the next chapter, I analyze the REDD+ projects in Vietnam, which is 
implementing the projects actively, and the international expectation is high. 
However, in terms of the involvement of indigenous people, it is not necessarily the 
case. I examine how the country attempts to implement the REDD+ projects and how 




3. REDD+ in Vietnam 
3.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, REDD+ projects in Vietnam will be analyzed. The historical 
context of the policies regarding indigenous people formed by the government and 
forest policies and forest management before the implementation of REDD+ projects 
are discussed in order to understand the current situation. The forest area in the 
country was rapidly declining; however, it started to recover after the 1990s. The 
government tried to deal with deforestation and forest degradation, and the country is 
a member of both the UN-REDD Programme and the FCPF. Vietnam actively sets 
policies of REDD+ and establishes relevant institutions for REDD+ implementation. 
The government’s activities reflect interests in the projects. The expectation of 
Vietnam at the international level, especially that of UN-REDD Programme, is high. 
Still, the government fails to take indigenous people’s rights into account, and 
REDD+ is promoted despite the lack of consideration to indigenous people. Since the 
government of Vietnam officially calls indigenous people as ethnic minorities, I will 
use the term ethnic minorities in this chapter. In the next section, I introduce the basic 
data of Vietnam, history of the relations between the government and indigenous 
people, and forest policies and forest management. Then, finally, I analyze the 
REDD+ projects and indigenous people of Vietnam. 
3.2. Basic Data 
 Vietnam is a communist state that is categorized as a part of Southeast Asia, 
located at the Southeast edge of Indochina Peninsula, facing the South China Sea, the  
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Figure 1. Map of Vietnam 
 
Source: Maps of World. “Political Map of Vietnam.” Compare Infobase. 19 Dec. 












Gulf of Thailand, and the Gulf of Tonkin (CIA “Vietnam”). Above is the map of the 
country. 
The country declared independence after the World War II, though France 
continued to rule until 1954. The population is about 94 million in 2015, and most of 
them are the Kinh, which is a major ethnic group that accounts for more than 85%. 
Other minor ethnic groups are: Tay (1.9%), Thai (1.8%), Muong (1.5%), Khmer 
(1.5%), and other groups follow. The official language is Vietnamese, and mountain 
area languages, such as Mon-Khmer and Malayo-Polynesian, are spoken. The real 
growth rate between 2012 and 2014 is around 5.5% per year, which ranks 37th in the 
world (CIA “Vietnam”).  
 Ethnic minorities living in the highlands are called ‘highlanders,’ and there 
are mainly two categories to divide them geographically: those minorities and 
indigenous people living in the central highlands and those in the northern highlands. 
Approximately 70% of ethnic minorities live in these areas (Dang 4). Many of the 
highlanders are thought to have arrived at the region more than 2,000 years ago, long 
before the arrival of the Kinh. Since the northern part is far from the markets, 
subsistence farming is the norm. The people in the central highlands are divided into 
at least thirty different ethnic groups that speak different languages. Some of them are 
Catholics or Protestants. This is due to the fact that the country was colonized by 
France and French missionaries entered into the highlands for education and 
commercial activities (MRGI). Historically, ethnic minorities in the highlands were 
disempowered by external powers, such as France, and, after World War II, the 
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government of Vietnam and the United States. In the next section, the history of the 
people in the highlands will be briefly discussed because it is essential to understand 
the relationship between the government and the people in the highlands, which 
deepens the understanding of the relationship of them in the context of REDD+.  
3.3. The government, Forest Policies, and Forest Management 
3.3.1. The Government and the Society 
 In this section, I briefly discuss the relationship between the government and 
the society. The current situation in Vietnam is becoming more complex in terms of 
the relationship between the government and the society, which is one of the 
important perspectives of the governance in Vietnam in addition to its relationship 
with ethnic minorities, which will be discussed through this chapter. Vietnam is a 
party-state, which is led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). This gives an 
impression that the country has the ability to strongly direct and regulate society. 
However, despite its superficial ability to control, the government continues to 
deteriorate (Fforde 146). David Koh argues that society plays an important role in 
policy implementation, stating that “state-society interaction and mutual influence in 
the shaping of policies” is characterized as “a constant ebb-and-flow pattern” (283). 
Corruption often happens. The research on Vietnam’s poverty-reduction in 
2004 conducted by Adam Fforde shows that “resources meant for the poor often 
ended up in the pockets of others” (150). Local officials usually have ways to get 
unofficial income through corruption due to the low salary they get (Koh 284). As 
mentioned, Vietnam takes an initiative with REDD+ at the international level, but that 
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does not mean that it has the ability to effectively implement the projects at the local 
level, considering the domestic situation of its inability in policy implementation and 
corruption. Yet, its policies on ethnic minorities have been relatively strict, which is 
discussed in the following section. 
3.3.2. The Government and Ethnic Minorities 
When hearing the word ‘Vietnam’ and ‘forest’, one may imagine the Vietnam 
War, which is infamous for the use of Agent Orange, a chemical defoliant used by the 
United States to eliminate forest cover to expose Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
troops using the cover and crops possibly provided to them. Ultimately, the United 
States military forces sprayed more than seventy million liters of herbicides over 1.8 
million hectares of land from 1961 to 1972. The operation not only devastated the 
forests but also caused health issues for people living there and the U.S. soldiers 
(History.com). During and after the war, ethnic minorities living in the highlands were 
affected by the country’s policy of assimilation and war attacks.  
 Prior to this, Vietnam was divided south and north after the Indochina War. 
Under the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), which was 
founded in 1945 in the northern part of current Vietnam, ethnic minorities, or 
highlanders, were characterized as backward, ignorant, stagnant, and superstitious, 
traits which only the ethnic Vietnamese could overcome (McLeod 370). Official 
literature did not mention the possibility that Vietnamese could learn from 
highlanders’ culture and its value (ibid).  
In the south, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) under the leader Ngo Dinh 
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Diem recognized French influence in the central highlands and set policies that the 
RVN would incorporate the highland areas and force highlanders to obey the same 
laws and administrative structures as lowland Vietnamese (Hickey 55; McLeod 373). 
Diem sent Vietnamese officials to the highlands to govern the area and other 
Vietnamese to settle there for national security and economic development (McLeod 
373), which means they displaced the highlanders who owned the land. Typical of the 
opinions that the highlanders had was that “[t]he Vietnamese talk equality, but they 
don’t mean what they say. In their hearts they want to dominate us. They are 
colonialists” (Hickey 67).  
The assimilation policy revived the hostility between highlanders and 
lowland Vietnamese in RVN. During the Vietnam War, the highlanders were trained 
by the United States army, with some of them used to monitor the infiltration routes of 
the enemy (McLeod 379). Also, the area became a battlefield during the war, and a 
number of highlanders lost their homes and lands (385).  
After the war, North and South Vietnam were unified and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was founded. The government of SRV promoted 
settlement of the Vietnamese to the highlands and highlanders to the lowlands 
(McLeod 386). Due to the assimilation promoted by the government, the ethnic 
minorities in the central highlands became frustrated by the loss of lands, threats to 
their culture and language, and limited access to education and health, leading to huge 
protests in 2001 and 2004 (MRGI). Even though about forty years have passed after 
the unification, highlanders and other ethnic minorities are treated unequally by the 
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government and their dissatisfaction still remains. 
As though there is no unified definition, the term “indigenous people” is 
generally understood to refer to “small populations relative to the dominant culture of 
their country…. usually have (or had) their own language…. distinctive cultural 
traditions that are still practiced…. [and] own land and territory” (Cultural Survival). 
In Vietnam, “many indigenous communities define themselves as “indigenous,” with 
respect to their ancestral territories which are being invaded by settlers” (Erni and 
Nilsson 451). However, the government does not use the term indigenous people, 
instead, it classifies people living in highlands as “ethnic minorities,” and there is no 
legislation that “define[s] ethnic minorities as a distinct group of people” (Lizduong 
n.pag.). This means that the Government of Vietnam has not fully recognized 
indigenous people’s culture and tradition, which has led to the destruction of those 
culture and tradition.  
 The central highlands occupies 16.3% of the total area of Vietnam, and more 
than half of the area is covered with forest, making it the most densely forested part of 
the country. The area is rich in minerals and used for agriculture, such as coffee and 
pepper, which are important commodities in Vietnam for its economy (ISL). Most of 
the ethnic minorities inhabit the interior mountains and highlands, and a large number 
of them are dependent on the forest for their livelihoods (MRGI; Hoang et al. 65). 
Even though the country achieved rapid economic growth, the level of development 
of ethnic minorities is still low; ethnic minorities constituted more than half the total 
poor population in 2009 (Luong 3). The people living in the forest have had their own 
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customary law on forest that defines owners of the forest land and its territorial 
boundaries. Even though the government acknowledges the importance of protecting 
the land rights of ethnic minorities, some contradictions can be identified between 
their recognition of the rights and the actual policy implementation. The use of the 
term “ethnic minorities” means that the government does not recognize their existence 
as “indigenous,” thus their policies on ethnic minorities apparently attempt to protect 
their rights, but the root of its recognition does not have the notion of conserving their 
inherent knowledge and tradition, which causes the persistence of uneven treatment of 
ethnic minorities. 
3.3.3. Forest Policies and Land Tenure (Present) 
 In Vietnam, deforestation was severe during the 1970s until the early 1990s, 
but the country has also experienced the rapid reforestation after the period 
(Meyfroidt and Lambin “Impacts” 1320). The total forest area has decreased from 
more than 43% in 1943 to 20% in 1993. Since then, the forest cover has recovered to 
39.7% in 2009, mainly due to an increase in plantations and natural forest regrowth 
(UN-REDD, UN-REDD Vietnam 14). Even though the total forest cover has increased 
since 1993, the quality and biodiversity of the forests were found to be decreasing; the 
area of natural forest that is classified as rich and medium decreased between 1999 
and 2005 (REDD Vietnam; Meyfroidt and Lambin, “Impacts” 1327). Figure 1 shows 
the forest transition from 1943 to 2007 in Vietnam. 
 Vietnam has set policies on the land and forest. The main institution that is 
responsible for the state administration of forests and forestry land is the Ministry of 
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Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). Under the MARD, the Vietnam 
Administration of Forestry (VNFOREST) was established for advising the Minister 
about state management and dealing with domestic forestry matters. Until the 1990s, 
policies of forest protection and management were weak due to the government’s 
emphasis on rebuilding the country and agricultural expansion (UN-REDD, UN-
REDD Vietnam 96). In the 1950s and 1960s, the government of DRV nationalized 
large part of the land in the midlands and highlands (Sikor 1). Thomas Sikor argues 
that forestry management by the state was unsuitable. The causes include unresolved 
conflicts between local people and state forest enterprise, and inadequate investment 
funds and innovation (2). Since then, the government established a number of policies 
and initiated several programs.  
 
Source: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Vietnam Forestry 
Outlook Study by Forest Science Institute of Vietnam (FSIV). Bangkok. Food and 
Agriculture Organization. 2009. Web. 10 Apr. 2015. The United Nations, Food and 
Agriculture Organization. Global Forest Resource Assessment 2010. Country Report: 






























































































Since 1994, the government has issued policies to allocate forestry land to 
individual households and economic enterprises to promote law and regulations on 
forestry land rights and achieve sustainable forest management (CERDA and CSDM 
13). In Vietnam, there are three types of forest categories. The first is Production 
Forests, managed by State Forest Enterprises (SFEs), which is being transformed to 
State-Owned Companies (SOCs), yet individuals and communities are sub-contracted 
to manage the forests. This forest category is for commercial purposes. Second is 
Protection Forests, which are managed by SFEs and individual households and 
categorized for watershed and environmental protection. Third is Special Use Forests 
that are managed mostly by Protected Area Management Boards (PAMBs). Their 
purpose is primarily for biodiversity conservation (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Vietnam 
100). Only 1% of the Production Forest is allocated to communities and 29% to 
households (CERDA and SCDM 16). Policies of the Protection Forests were set to 
promote the participation of local community members in forest protection and to get 
benefits; however, due to a lack of access to policy information, they have not been 
effective (7).  
The Constitution states that all land belongs to the people, and the state 
administers on behalf of the people, which means there is no legal status for 
individuals, communities or companies in terms of the land ownership. However, the 
actors are able to obtain land use rights and transfer those rights. Decision 187 set up 
a process by which forest land is allocated to households, and those who secure the 
Red Book, which is a certificate of land use that is valid for fifty years (UN-REDD, 
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UN-REDD Vietnam 15). There are eight different groups that are entrusted with forest 
management by the government: SFEs; individual households; Protection Forest 
Management Board (PFMBs); management boards for Special Use Forests (PAMBs); 
commune level people’s committees; local communities; joint venture enterprises; 
and army units (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Vietnam 97-98).  
The Prime Minister’s Decision 145-2005-QD-TTg of 15/6/2005 confiscated 
productive forestry land from state-owned enterprises and redistributed it to ethnic 
minority households (CERDA and CSDM 13). Do Dinh Sam and Le Quang Trung 
emphasize that households and individuals have legal rights to own forest and forest 
land. The authors state that the participation of households, individuals, and local 
communities illustrated in Vietnam’s forestry sector, plays an important role in forest 
development, and that through the changes in policy, “Vietnam has achieved 
favourable results in forestry” citing the increase in forest cover as shown in the above 
figure (Do and Le 73). Due to deforestation until the 1990s, the government has tried 
to improve the forest situation and set policies on protecting forests. The success of 
the policies imposed for forest development is shown by the increase of forest cover. 
However, the causes of forest expansion remain controversial. Other claims include 
that higher productivity of agriculture or illegal timber imports from other countries is 
the primary cause (McElwee “Payments” 417). However, the forest cover data does 
not show how people living in forests have been protected, or whether they were 
treated equally with the Kinh. The government agencies, such as SFEs, hold better 
quality of land. In the Central Highlands, as Pamela McElwee reports, less than two 
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percent of the total forest land is held by households, and in Dak Lak province of the 
Highlands, the farm lands of almost half of ethnic minorities’ households were 
inadequate for their food production needs in 2002 (417-418). Vietnam succeeded in 
increasing forest cover at a state level, but under the forest policies, there are an 
exclusion of ethnic minorities and prioritizing government agencies to hold better 
quality of forests. This will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
3.4. REDD+ Projects from the Official Position 
 The Government of Vietnam states that the country “is considered among the 
most vulnerable countries to the adverse effects of climate change,” and therefore, 
“the country has much to gain by joining the international efforts to mitigate global 
climate change” (UN-REDD, UN-REDD, 13). Most recently, Vietnam has started 
introducing REDD+ projects in 2009. In this section, in order to analyze how the state 
government regards community participation and land tenure issue in REDD+ 
projects, the reports of the UN-REDD Programme in Vietnam will be assessed. The 
UN-REDD Programme in Vietnam is supporting VNFOREST to establish and 
manage an effective, transparent, and equal implementation of REDD+ programs 
(RCFEE 3). By analyzing the reports published by the UN-REDD Programme in 
Vietnam, it becomes possible to understand how the government deals with the 
projects, how the related government institutions evaluate their efforts to promote 
local participation, and how the institutions justify their project management in terms 
of community participation.  
The reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be assessed to 
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support the arguments of the government in REDD+ projects. This enables me to find 
the contradiction between the understanding of the government on community 
participation and land tenure, and how it is emphasized in the actual implementation. 
3.4.1. Institutions in Vietnam, the UN-REDD Programme and the FCPF 
 Vietnam is one of the original pilot countries of the UN-REDD Programme. 
Moreover, Vietnam is the first country that officially launched Phase II of the UN-
REDD Programme (UN-REDD “Viet Nam”). The objective of the UN-REDD 
Programme in Vietnam is “to support the Government in developing an effective 
REDD implementation mode and contributing to reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change in the region and all over the world” (CERDA and CSDM 26). 
Cooperating with the UN-REDD Programme, Vietnam started Phase I to achieve 
REDD+ readiness in 2009. This included the development of institutional 
infrastructure and REDD+ policy, contribution to formulation of reference levels and 
design of an MRV system, initiation to consult, and designing awareness-raising 
processes. Consequently, the Programme has succeeded in establishing the National 
REDD Network, the National REDD Steering Committee, the development of the 
National REDD+ Action Programme (NRAP) and other framework needed to 
implement REDD+ (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Vietnam 18-19). 
In addition to being one of the members of the UN-REDD Programme, 
Vietnam is one of the first participants that received approval of its Readiness Plan 
Idea Note (R-PIN) by the FCPF. The FCPF is a World Bank institution that assists 
developing countries to prepare for REDD+, and it establishes a framework and 
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procedure for REDD+ readiness (REDD Desk “Forest”). The Readiness Preparation 
Proposal (R-PP) of Vietnam was approved by the World Bank and the Bank is 
performing due diligence on activities that are grant-financed (UN-REDD, UN-REDD 
Vietnam 19). Phase II and the R-PP are inter-linked, and the two institutions, the UN-
REDD Programme and the FCPF, have designed collaborative activities and 
frameworks (19-20). Vietnam has consistently submitted necessary documents and 
proposals, such as Country Progress Sheets that explains the institutional 
improvements within the country, demonstrating the government’s positive attitude to 
REDD+. 
The Government assigns roles to appropriate governmental organizations, 
such as forestry sector to the MARD and VNFOREST, and coordinate stakeholders’ 
efforts and activities through the Vietnam REDD+ Steering Committee (REDD Desk 
“Vietnam: Actors”). Vietnam opened the Website “REDD Vietnam,” in Vietnamese 
and English, to provide information of events and legal documents related to REDD+ 
projects in Vietnam, enabling users to find documents they need.  
 In 2012, the Prime Minister approved the NRAP. The overall aim of the 
Programme is to contribute to the successful implementation of national strategy on 
climate change and poverty reduction goals towards sustainable development 
(Vietnam 2). The decision stipulates the objective of poverty alleviation through 
REDD+ implementation. Furthermore, one of the specific objectives in the period of 
2011 to 2015 refers to “raising awareness and capacity of relevant parties to 
participate proactively in REDD+ activities” (Vietnam 3), which includes not only 
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national and province level parties but also community level parties. Clearly, the 
government acknowledges the importance of the education and training of parties at 
the community level, indicating its intention on holistic inclusion of all stakeholders. 
However, it is not really the case on the ground. Some criticize that community 
participation and training is not sufficient in REDD+ activities. This will be fully 
discussed in the later section.  
 The UN-REDD Phase II Programme aims at testing and developing 
participatory monitoring, which includes collecting improved data with reduced costs 
and increasing participants’ commitment to the projects (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Viet 
Nam 21). Phase II will provide capacity building required for the REDD+ activities at 
the local levels: village, commune and district level (24). The Programme will support 
the NRAP and development of national REDD+ systems (21). The Programme is 
expected to generate six outcomes related to the implementation of REDD+: the 
establishment of capacities for an operational NRAP; ensuring that the six pilot 
provinces, Lam Dong, Ca Mau, Binh Thuan, Ha Tinh, Bac Kan, and Lao Cai, are able 
to plan and implement REDD+ actions; the operationalization of the national forest 
monitoring system for MRV and the national REDD+ information system on 
safeguards; ensuring that stakeholders receive positive incentives; the establishment 
of mechanisms to address the social and environmental safeguards; and the 
enhancement of REDD+ implementation in the Lower Mekong Sub-Region through 
regional cooperation (24-25). The second outcome mentions that different provinces 
have taken different land allocation processes, which led to the different land tenure 
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arrangements, and the country already has experienced that land allocation processes 
take time and consultation with local stakeholders and local authorities is essential. 
The Programme is expected to result in improved land tenure arrangements in the six 
pilot provinces through its work with provincial to village level authorities (37). 
3.4.2. The Government and Ethnic Minorities in REDD+ 
 According to the report provided by the FAO, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), and Vietnam, the government of Vietnam acknowledges that the 
coordination of the government and ethnic minorities is sometimes not sufficient in 
terms of engaging the minorities in poverty alleviation activities. The report concludes 
this is due to a lack of communication with minorities on new laws and programs, 
cultural differences, and interpretation of the poverty alleviation activities. The 
government understands that ethnic minorities are important stakeholders in REDD+ 
as they depend on natural forests for their livelihoods and they have customary land 
and forest tenure. Also, the government maintains that it has paid attention to ethnic 
minorities’ land use rights on forest land and issued Decisions and Resolutions (FAO 
et al. 16). This indicates that the government recognizes the different understanding 
from the ethnic minorities in terms of new law enforcement and has made efforts to 
implement REDD+ projects with taking their rights into account.  
 The Centre of Research and Development in Upland Areas (CERDA) and the 
Centre for Sustainable Development in Mountainous Areas (CSDM), which assist 
Vietnam in REDD+, investigated the relationship between REDD+ and ethnic 
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minorities. They found that REDD+ gives priority to ethnic communities especially in 
mountain areas and recognizes that the communities are essential participants 
(CERDA and CSDM 19), and the government “has paid great attention to the rights of 
ethnic minorities to forest and forestry land as evidenced by the nationwide policy on 
forest and forestry land allocation” (27). However, they also refer to the fact that the 
division of forest into three types and forestry land allocation to different users has 
disturbed the customary forest management systems (30). This is one of the important 
factors that complicate REDD+ implementation. The gap between policies and 
customary laws, which existed long before the current government-issued policies on 
land and forest rights, is a serious problem since it directly affects individuals’ rights 
to forest and forest resources and benefits expected through the implementation of 
REDD+. This issue will be further discussed in the next section.  
 Overall, Vietnam has been the pioneer of REDD+ projects. It became one of 
the first participants of the UN-REDD Programme and received approval of its 
Readiness Plan Idea Note from the FCPF. Moreover, the country is the first to launch 
the Phase II Programme and provide a practical example of the application of FPIC 
principles in REDD+ (UN-REDD, Lessons Learned 10). Vietnam has carried out a 
number of policy reforms and pilot projects of REDD+, and evaluated those impacts. 
The government acknowledges the issue of land rights allocation to ethnic minorities, 
and it seems that the country is one of the closest to successful implementation of 
REDD+. However, the government still lacks some consideration to the ethnic 
minorities. These issues include the difference between statutory law and customary 
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law, and the quality of the lands that are allocated to minorities. In the next section, I 
will develop the debate on land tenure issue with mainly employing NGOs’ reports 
and scholars’ articles.  
3.5. Community Participation and Land Tenure in Vietnam 
 In this section, I will first discuss forest policies, especially how the 
regulations regarding to three types of forests have impacts on ethnic minorities and 
the gap between statutory and customary law from an ethnic minority perspective by 
utilizing international NGOs’ reports. Second, I will use field research on local 
communities conducted by scholars and NGOs to analyze how the insecurity and 
ambiguity of land tenure affects community participation in REDD+ activities. It 
became clear that the issues the government and the ethnic minorities had before 
starting REDD+ still persist and have negative impacts on the community 
participation. These are mainly unequal land allocation to ethnic minorities and the 
difference between statutory law and customary law. 
3.5.1. Forest Allocation from Ethnic Minorities’ Perspective 
 As explained, forests are categorized into three different types: Production 
Forests, Protection Forests, and Special Use Forests. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
forest area (regardless of the types of forests) managed by different groups. 33% of 
forest land is allocated to the PAMBs and PFMBs, which occupies 4.6 million ha (To 
and Tran 9). Village communities and households are only allocated 29% of total 





Source: To Xuan Phuc, and Tran Huu Nghi. Forest Land Allocation in the Context of 
Forestry Sector Restructuring: Opportunities for Forestry Development and Upland 
Livelihood Improvement. Hue, Vietnam: Tropenbos International Viet Nam, June 
2014. Web. 26 Apr. 2015. 
According to Do Trong et al., households and individuals have the rights of 
access, use, management, and alienation on their Production Forests, but they have 
fewer rights in Protection Forests and Special Use Forests, especially compared to the 
government (3). Details are in Table 2 below. It is clear that rights of individuals and 
households are limited mainly to Production Forests whereas state agencies hold most 
of the rights.  
 In addition to standard forest land allocation, households and individuals are 
provided contract-based allocation. Standard forest land allocation is between the 
state and local people, and contract-based allocation of forest and forest land occurs 



























Tran 5). The state agencies allocate Production Forest land for commercial purposes, 
or Protection Forest land for conservation purposes (23). That is, the state will 
allocate a part of the forest land to state agencies, such as SFEs, PAMBs, and PFMBs, 
not directly to individuals and households. The agencies will then allocate the forest 
land to individuals and households, which complicate the process of forest land 
allocation.  
Table 1. The relationship of forest land tenure types and users 
User Access Use rights Management Alienation 
PDF* PTF* SUF* PDF PTF SUF PDF PTF SUF PDF PTF SUF 
State 
agencies 
● ● ● ● ●   ● ● ● ● ●   
Individuals and 
Households 
● ●   ● ●   ●     ●     
Communities ● ●   ● ●   ● ●         
Economic 
Entities 
● ●   ● ●   ●     ●     
Note. PDF: Production Forests; PTF: Protection Forests; SUF: Special Use Forests 
Source: Do, Trong H, Catacutan D, Vu Thi H, Lai Tung Q. “Will Current Forest Land 
Tenure Impede REDD+ Efforts in Vietnam?” Policy Brief No. 27. Nairobi: ASB 
Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, World Agroforestry Centre. 2012. 1-3. 
Print.   
Despite the government’s emphasis on poor people and ethnic minorities in 
forest policies, it is often difficult for households and individuals, especially poor, to 
receive high quality forest and forest land. The problem of the standard forest land 
allocation is that the government allocates Protection Forests, Special Use Forests, 
and Production Forests that are categorized as natural forests to state agencies, 
whereas households and individuals will be allocated only poor Production Forests 
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and bare lands. To and Tran reported that that 53% of the total area allocated to 
households was the natural forest, but more than 70% of them was “poor”, which 
reduced possible benefits from the forest (34). Additionally, one of the issues of the 
contract-based allocation is that it provides fewer rights to recipients than standard 
allocation (27).  
Not only the allocation system itself, but also Vietnam has a problem of an 
unequal allocation among households. Forest land allocation depends greatly on 
communal power structures; “‘governmental’ households” had better access to 
relevant information, and after all, they got more accessible land plots whereas poor 
households were allocated less land. In terms of the ethnicity, the Kinh group received 
more benefits than ethnic minorities (To and Tran 45). Therefore, forest land 
allocation possibly further marginalizes the poor and minorities.  
The laws relating to forest rights sometimes are inconsistent with customary 
law. Customary law defines how rights are ruled, allocated, and preserved, and 
customary tenure is defined as “the access, control and use of land according to long-
standing principles operating outside the formal legal system” (Nguyen et al. 26). 
People in rural communities put importance on customary law of forest land tenure, 
but administrators at different levels tend to be unaware of, or “consciously ignore” 
(CIRUM 11), the importance of customary law for controlling land and resources, 
making it difficult to incorporate customary law into formal land management 
practice (Nguyen et al. 26). Furthermore, statutory law is often too difficult for 
community members to understand and may be inaccessible due to its complexity 
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(CIRUM 55). Table 2 summarizes the differences between statutory law and 
customary law. 
Table 2. Difference between statutory law and customary law 
  Statutory law Customary Law 
Owner of the land 
People (The state administers the 
land on behalf of people) 
Gods (Invisible and supreme 
owners of forest land and 
resources) 
Units of land right 
holders 
The state agencies, economic 




The state officials neighborhood network 
Allocation The state First-come, first-serve 
Rights of exclusion 
Right holders have the right to 
exclude others. The government 
enforcement may be weak which 
possibly causes conflict.  
This may result in weakened 
tenure 
Communities have the right to 
exclude others. 
Benefit sharing Regulated by state regulations Among community members 
Land use 
Users cannot freely change the 
use purpose of land allocated to 
them  
Communities can decide the use 
of the forest land. 
Rights to control 
The state. Forest owners have 
limited rights to control 
Community head or land guardian 
Tenure security 
A forest land use title valid for 50 
years 
When community members 
recognize 
Source: Nguyen, Quang Tan, Nguyen Van Chinh, and Vu Thu Hanh. Statutory and 
Customary Forest Rights and their Governance Implications: The Case of Viet Nam. 
Hanoi: International Union for Conservation of Nature. 08 Jul. 2008. Web. 28 Apr. 
2015. 
Statutory law brought about changes to villagers, and the government 
policies has changed local people’s ways of life. Before 1960, forest land belonged to 
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communities, and community members managed their land according to customary 
law. People did not have conflict over natural resources due to low population density 
and ample resources (CIRUM 49). However, the government had launched a land 
reform program, took and gave the land to villagers, which caused conflicts between 
villagers and the local government (Hickey 360). The government then started an 
economic renovation (doi moi) in 1986, which incorporated villagers into the 
international market by favoring cash crop production. Hickey describes the case of 
Khanh Hau, which had a homogenous way of life among villagers. After many of the 
villagers lost land, the land was redistributed to them, and they started producing rice 
for the international market. The relative isolation of Khanh Hau was dispelled by the 
increase of village members and proliferation of modern communications (Hickey 
362-363). Hickey states that “homogeneity in style of life, attitudes and values, social 
expectations, and livelihood activities” diminished (363).  
One of the crucial differences between statutory law and customary law is the 
units of land right holders. In statutory law, the forest land rights are mainly 
distributed to individuals and households. On the other hand, in customary law, 
villages have been the units of the rights holders of forest land and forest resources. 
The difference of units means that traditional community land ownership and rights of 
use had to be transferred to households, and most of the land has been distributed to 
other state organizations and economic entities including current national parks, 
which strictly limit the use of forest resources by people (Nguyen et al. 27). The 
above table shows a part of the differences of the two: statutory law often ignores 
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customary law, and the inconsistency of the two laws has negative impact on the local 
community members. 
Ta Phin commune is an example that shows how statutory law changed 
indigenous forest management. The research was conducted in 2010 in Lao Cai 
province, which is located in the Northern part of Vietnam. There, 449 households out 
of 475 households were ethnic minorities, and the remaining were the Kinh. The two 
majority ethnic groups in the area, the Dzao and the Red Dzao people, migrated to the 
area between the 13th century and the 1940s, and they held on to their traditional 
cultures (CIRUM 39). The smallest administrative unit was the village, and a village 
leader was responsible for public administration before 1960. Forests were considered 
as belonging to the community, and every household owned a part of the forest (44). 
However, after the national land reforms were carried out, “existing community 
boundaries and their local cultures and customs were neglected totally and the people 
who entirely depended on forests were denied access to the lands and forests they 
perceived to be their own and their ancestors” (55). To date, the statutory law does not 
fully recognize the land management rights of communities, which is the major 
difference from the customary law (ibid). The forest was sustainably managed by the 
village members through customary law before statutory law was imposed on them. 
However, after the nationalization of forests, the deforestation rate increased and 
indigenous customs, such as rituals, were lost due to the allocation of forests to state 
entities. While not unique, the Ta Phin case is an excellent example that highlights 




These are the problems surrounding forest land rights of ethnic minorities. 
The government expresses its concern over ethnic minorities and other poor people, 
yet that concern is not fully reflected in law implementation. The unequal land 
allocation between the state agencies and individuals clearly reduces individuals’ 
possible benefits if they were allocated high quality forest land the same as the state 
agencies. It would be difficult for the government to acknowledge the conflict 
especially at the micro-level (such as the one between households), but it is their role 
to regulate at the state level so that local authorities can follow the state policies on 
land allocation and conflict resolution. Also, the government should impose laws that 
are congruent with customary law, not excluding it. Ethnic minorities already have 
customary law that functions well for them. It is possible to improve the situation in 
the highlands if the government makes use of the existent customs on land and forest 
use as an aid to implement statutory law. Yet, the problems continue to be barriers for 
ethnic minorities to establish their rights on forest land, which also limit REDD+ 
work in the pilot provinces. 
3.5.2. Forest Rights, Ethnic Minorities and REDD+ 
 The problems of forest policies have great impacts on REDD+ 
implementation. Ethnic minorities are excluded from state level decision-making 
processes on forest policies, resulting in unequal land allocation. I will analyze how 
the issues of forest land allocation discussed above are perceived by communities and 
what kind of problems they have in addition to the issues previously discussed.  
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 The differences between statutory law and customary law continue to be a 
problem in REDD+ implementation (Larson et al. 682). Tran Nam Tu and Mucahid 
Mustafa Bayrak conducted research in Hieu commune, Kon Plong district and found 
that the land allocated to the village did not correspond to the customary boundary. 
The authors report that the village received a total of about 4,000 ha of natural forest 
land. However, the villagers’ customary boundaries covered about 6,000 ha, and the 
land that was not allocated to them was managed by the SFE and the Watershed 
Management Board, an agency of the provincial government. The discrepancy 
between the land allocated and customary boundaries would possibly cause conflicts 
between the communities and the formal actors who manage the land. Therefore, in 
this case, the villagers requested the local authorities to correct the discrepancy under 
the REDD+ project before the issue becomes more serious (Tran and Mucahid 113). 
The authors did not report the outcome of the negotiation, so it is not clear if the 
request by the villagers were accepted. 
Another issue that REDD+ in Vietnam has is forest management contracts 
between state agencies and local households. Nguyen Quang Tan reported a lack of 
community participation in decision-making processes of forest management. The 
Participatory Governance Assessment for REDD+ (PGA) was launched in Lam Dong 
province. It is supported by the UN-REDD Programme and produces credible 
information on specific governance issues and can be used to improve REDD+ 
project implementation (Nguyen 1). In Lam Dong, one of the REDD+ pilot areas, the 
majority of forest areas are managed by state forest organizations, and local people 
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enter into forest contracts for forest protection, restoration, plantation establishment or 
forest management with state forest organizations (Nguyen 7). The author confirmed 
a lack of participation of local people due to ignorance of their rights to participate in 
the process of forest contracts; only ten out of 33 interviewed groups of households 
knew two of their fundamental rights, which are “the right to information about forest 
contracts and to vote for which households get forest contracts.” Nine of them knew 
none of their rights (29-30). Instead, the state forest organizations took initiative in the 
process (32). This top-down manner in making forest contracts curtails the limited 
rights to forest and forest resources of local community members. Moreover, the 
research found that customary law has not been incorporated into the legal 
frameworks, which often leads to continuation of conflicts over forests and forest 
resources (59). 
In terms of the actual REDD+ implementation, some problems of the FPIC 
activities in REDD+ are reported. Pham et al. define FPIC as follows: ‘free’ means 
that “consent is given freely and voluntarily, with no coercion, manipulation, or 
intimidation and following a process directed by the community, respecting the time 
requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes”; ‘prior’ indicates that 
“consent is to be sought in advance of any activities, at the early stages of 
development”; and ‘informed’ means that “communities have been provided with 
complete information and understand the potential impact” (“FPIC” 2407). In the 
REDD+ projects carried out within territories of indigenous people, FPIC is the 
fundamental step to involve indigenous people. 
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The research on FPIC was carried out by Pamela McElwee in Lam Dong. An 
interviewee, who was the head of the provincial agricultural extension service, 
answered that “FPIC is taken from a foreign model, and it’s not really suitable for 
Vietnam. FPIC is based on the idea that communities have rights and voice [over 
forests]” (McElwee “Conservation”10). In Vietnam, communities’ rights to forest 
management are not secured, as shown in the little allocation of forest land to them. 
Therefore, the model that REDD+ applies does not fit the form of forest management 
at a community level in Vietnam.  
Moreover, about FPIC meetings at a village level, McElwee reported that it 
was only a couple of hours to get consent for REDD+, and only forty-five minutes 
allocated for question time (“Conservation” 11). Pham et al. conducted research in 
Lam Dong, Thai Nguyen, and Nghe An provinces and report that local people had 
limited influence on information selection; project proponents decided the training 
content and methods without asking community members (”FPIC” 2416). McElwee 
reports that what was problematic in the meeting was that the participants were 
offered information of positive aspects of REDD+, but possible risks and costs of 
participation were not explained to them (“Conservation” 11). This was also shown 
by Pham et al. The authors found that villagers in Lam Dong and Thai Nguyen were 
provided information of only the positive impacts of REDD+ (Pham et al. “FPIC” 
2417). The manipulation of information causes a fundamental problem of a lack of 
understanding by local participants. FPIC, which should be the first step of promoting 
local participation in REDD+ projects, maintains a top-down approach of information 
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provision, which disadvantages local participants in the process of the 
implementation. 
The cases of Hieu commune and Nguyen’s report of Lam Dong province 
indicate the possible conflicts over land rights of the communities if the formal 
boundary and customary boundary are different, which may limit the use of forest and 
forest resources by the community members. In the case of Hieu commune, the 
members could at least claim their traditional territorial boundaries, but it also shows 
that REDD+ may face this kind of issue when being implemented. Therefore, REDD+ 
not only has to clarify who owns the land, but also on what basis a land manager 
claims that the land belong to him/her.  
3.5.3. Attempts to Establish a REDD+ Benefit Distribution System 
The government stated that a state level approach to a local benefit 
distribution system (BDS) would be tested and developed (UN-REDD, UN-REDD 
Viet Nam 24). Also, it said that “[an] efficient, equitable and transparent benefit 
distribution system (BDS) is considered of vital importance to the success of 
REDD+” (UN-REDD, Consultations 7). Moreover, it acknowledged the necessity of 
establishing BDS to provide incentives to beneficiaries at a provincial level and 
declares that the Programme would carry out BDS in piloted areas (UN-REDD, UN-
REDD Viet Nam 47). Indeed, VNFOREST has been working on establishing a BDS 
since 2009, and it coordinates capacity building activities at provincial and district 
level; however, they are not carried out at a community level (Stephenson et al. 13).  
Moreover, Vietnam has experiences with PES. The government issued 
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Decision 380/QD-TTg on piloting Payments for Forest Environmental Services 
(PFES) in 2008. This decision is intended to request users of environmental services, 
such as hydropower plants, to pay for providers of environmental services to protect 
forests (Pham “Policy” 387). Following the Decision, Decree 99 was issued in 2010, 
which defines the process of PFES. The Decision “creates the foundation for REDD 
policies development in Vietnam” (388). Even though the pilot projects of PES is new 
and not adequate to provide solid lessons of how the payments and performance can 
be linked in the REDD+ BDS, the government expects that the PES pilot projects can 
indicate a possible institutional structure of REDD+ BDS through further testing and 
assessment of the pilot projects (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Viet Nam 134). 
REDD+ projects in Vietnam have not transferred any fund to participating 
localities (McElwee “Conservation” 10). How to establish a sound BDS has been a 
critical issue in order to provide sufficient rewards for local community members. The 
government is relying on its experience with the payment for conservation of the 
environment by local people. It is true that PES experience is beneficial for REDD+ 
BDS discussions as the government can apply the scheme of PES to REDD+. 
However, some problems within existent PES were found. First, it is difficult for local 
households to obtain land use right certificates for state owned land under PES 
schemes because of the complicated procedures (Pham “Policy” 389). Second, the 
contract and the level of payment were mainly decided by the buyers under PES 
scheme (390). Third, the payments are often too small to offer local households a 
positive incentive to protect the forests or ease poverty (393). In the PES schemes, the 
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marginalization of local households is confirmed. Unless these problems are solved, 
utilizing PES to REDD+ BDS will generate the same issues of unequal decision-
making rights of local households. 
The absence of local participation in both forest land allocation and decision-
making processes in PES contracts and insufficient payment make it difficult to create 
positive incentives of local community members. For those reasons, it will be 
problematic if the government just diverts the PES schemes to REDD+. In this sense, 
it is important for the government to review the land tenure policies along with the 
REDD+ implementation to enhance local participation in the projects. 
 The problems discussed in this chapter all show the tight control by the 
government. It can be seen not only in land allocation but also in how media dealing 
with REDD+. In Vietnam, media is under control of the government, and “[t]he role 
of the media is to spread propaganda about state policies and politics, and to promote 
patriotism and socialist ideology” (Pham “REDD+” 3). Pham Thu Thuy conducted 
research on how media in Vietnam discusses REDD+ and found that the debates on 
REDD+ were mainly at the international and national levels, and the topics were 
predominantly politics and policy making, such as Decision 380/QD-TTg on piloting 
Payments for Forest Environmental Services (12, 17). Indigenous groups were not 
featured in any newspaper (20). Given that the media in Vietnam serves as 
propaganda of the government, it is no wonder that most of discussions were policy-
related. Therefore, it is difficult for mass media in Vietnam to criticize REDD+ (28), 
which lead to insufficient information provision to people. 
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 Unequal land allocation has been an issue in REDD+. The fact that state 
agencies manage the highest-quality forests, and non-state actors were allocated 
poorer-quality forests is problematic in several ways. First, even though the 
government aims at poverty alleviation by implementing REDD+, no substantial 
change among poor people’s livelihoods will occur if the land allocated to poor 
people has low productivity. Second, poor people with poor quality forest land may 
receive less funds from REDD+ than the state agencies so the actual forest managers 
receive little payment and the government monopolizes most of the funds (Larson et 
al. 683). In fact, monopolization of access to land by local elites and forestry entities 
cause a problem of elite capture of benefits (Pham “Policy” 389). This directly leads 
to worse situations for local communities in two ways. First, the possibility will arise 
that local community members cannot participate in planning activities, MRV, and 
receiving and managing rewards (Larson et al. 683). Second, in addition to the 
absolute gap between the government and local communities’ land rights, benefit 
distribution for local communities will be inadequate because of the poorer quality 
forest land allocated to them. The state will be rewarded, since it is one of the 
stakeholders, leading to the decrease of potential benefits from REDD+ distributed to 
each household. These two factors may make it hard to motivate local community 
members to participate in forest protection (To and Tran 57). This is why insecure 
tenure rights of local communities will negatively effect their participation in REDD+ 





 In this chapter, I investigated the causes that inhibit community participation 
in REDD+ projects in Vietnam. The country has a long history of government 
attempts to manipulate ethnic minorities. The government forced the Kinh, the major 
ethnic group, to migrate to the uplands, where ethnic minorities had lived. These 
former lowlanders became local elites, who exploited the traditional ethnic minority 
highlanders. The forest, which is the home to a number of forest dependent people, 
mostly ethnic minorities, had continued to decline until the mid-1990s.  
 The government has set a number of policies to protect forests and improve 
the situation of forest degradation. According to the Constitution, all land belongs to 
the people, and the state administers on behalf of the people. The state allocates the 
land to state agencies, economic entities, individuals and households. Due to the land 
reform previously implemented and the country’s initiative on REDD+, it seems that 
Vietnam is successful in implementing the projects. However, the tight control of the 
government creates unequal land allocation between state agencies and local people. 
Also, the issue of statutory law and customary law should be highlighted in REDD+ 
implementation since it affects the territorial boundary and recognition of land tenure 
that ethnic minorities hold. Failure in land allocation and defining the territorial 
boundaries possibly causes a lack of motivation of local communities to participate in 
REDD+ projects and unequal and insufficient benefit distribution to those 
communities.  
The challenge that Vietnam has is how to solve the land tenure issue and 
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motivate people to actively participate in the projects. Can it learn from Nepal, a 
country which is said to be a successful case in terms of community forest 
management, and is also one of the REDD+ participant countries? In the next chapter, 
REDD+ projects in Nepal will be analyzed. The aim of the research is to find lessons 




4. REDD+ in Nepal 
4.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will analyze how REDD+ projects in Nepal are 
implemented, particularly in respect to how they address the rights of local 
community members. Nepal, officially the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, is 
considered by numerous scholars as a successful case of REDD+ implementation in 
terms of community participation. Research reveals the active participation of local 
community members. Moreover, international organizations, such as the UNEP, 
emphasize the success of community forestry in Nepal. Policy reforms of forestry 
were launched in the late 1970s with the government acknowledging its failure in 
forest management. Since then, communities have formed community forest user 
groups (CFUGs) and have managed forests, exercising a broad range of forest use 
rights, including the right to self-governance and to benefit from forest resources. The 
CFUG system is utilized in REDD+ implementation in Nepal as it is regarded as 
efficient and effective.  
 In the next section, I will first provide the background of Nepal, specifically 
the geographic and demographic data and the political history. Secondly, forest 
policies set by the government will be discussed; thirdly, community forest 
management before REDD+ implementation will be investigated; and lastly, 
community participation in REDD+ projects will be analyzed from both the official 
position and local community perspective. The aims of this chapter are to reveal the 
reasons why Nepal is said to be a successful case of community forest management, 
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what motivates community members to actively participate in forest management, and 
how the community members are involved in REDD+ projects. 
4.2. Basic Data 
 
Source: Nepal International Arts Programme. “Maps.” Web. 08 May. 2015. 
 Nepal is located in Southern Asia, between China and India, and the 
elevation is from 60 to 8848m above sea level (Ito et al. 453). Geographically, Nepal 
is divided into three zones: the High Mountain, Middle Hill, and Siwalik (Sherpa et 
al. 140). Nepal is one of the least developed countries in the world, and about a 
quarter of the population lives below the poverty line (CIA “Nepal”). The main 
industry is agriculture, on which Nepal depends for many of the people’s livelihood 
(ibid). Despite the fact that people are heavily dependent on forest resources, the 
percentage of forest area was only 25.4% in 2005 (World Bank “Nepal”). Therefore, 
sustainable forest management is extremely important for the livelihood of people 
Figure 4. Map of Nepal 
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living there (Ito et al. 454).  
 Nepal has a history of protests against monarchy. The country was an 
absolute monarchy from the establishment of the Shah dynasty in 1769 until 2008 
(Naturally Nepal). In 1951, the Nepali monarch was overthrown and a cabinet system 
that brought political parties into the government was started (CIA “Nepal”). 
However, by 1960, King Mahendra dissolved Parliament. A people’s movement 
occurred in 1990, which led King Birendra to accept constitutional reform and 
establish a multiparty parliament (Naturally Nepal). The Maoist parties declared the 
People’s War in 1996, which resisted monarchy and the elected government. But the 
King had power again in 2002 (ibid). In 2006, huge protests occurred against the new 
King, which led the King to abandon his power, and the prime minister and the 
Maoists signed the Peace Accord. Finally, in 2008, the Constituent Assembly declared 
Nepal a federal democratic republic and abolished the monarchy that had existed for 
240 years (ibid).  
 Nepal is an ethnically diverse country. The largest ethnic group is Chhettri, 
which forms 16.6% of the population. The second most populous group is the 
Brahman-Hill, which is 12.2%. Other ethnic groups make up the rest of the population 
with each group comprising less than 10%. In 2011, 125 caste and ethnic groups were 
reported. The official language is Nepali, but 123 languages are spoken. The major 
religion is Hindu, which accounts for more than 80% of the population (CIA 
“Nepal”). The number of indigenous people is said to be between 35% to more than 
50% of the total population. Yet, historically, “indigenous peoples have been 
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marginalized in terms of language, culture, and political and economic opportunities” 
(IWGIA). In the National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous 
Nationalities (NFDIN) Act-2002, fifty nine indigenous groups were identified 
(IWGIA; Sherpa et al. 140). The country’s attempts to recognize indigenous people 
and cultural diversity are still under way. 
4.3. Forest and Land Policies, and REDD+ from the Official Position 
4.3.1. The Government and Indigenous People 
 Nepal has a history of exclusion and marginalization of indigenous people, 
and the socio-economic differences are clear among different ethnic groups (CCD 1). 
Indigenous people have resided there since time immemorial, but they lost their 
autonomy and ancestral lands when King Pritvinarayan Shah integrated the country in 
1769. The first national legislation promulgated in 1854, the Muliki Ain (Civil Code), 
was predatory to indigenous people since “it legally categorized indigenous peoples 
as the Matwali or liquor-drinking caste, second in the four-fold caste hierarchy, and 
further subdivided into the “unslavable” and “slavable”” (Bhattachan 3). Starting 
from the first Constitution in the 1940s, the constitutions have not recognized the 
social, cultural, and religious diversity of indigenous people (ibid). Nepal oppressed 
indigenous people during the monarchy, and this power structure still continues today 
even though the government recognizes the necessity to protect the rights of 
indigenous people.  
The government after the 1950s did not adequately address the issues of 
indigenous people (Sherpa et al. 152). Indigenous people in Nepal reside in rural areas 
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and depend on agriculture for their livelihood. More than half of the indigenous 
people remain below the poverty line, and the poverty stems from structural 
discrimination, lack of political representation, and lack of access to education and 
employment opportunities (CCD 4). The recognition of multi-ethnicity has increased 
especially after 1990, when the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal declared that 
the country is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country. The government officially 
recognized indigenous people for the first time, but still it is not sufficient as it could 
not address the issues of indigenous people’s rights (Sherpa et al. 153).  
The NFDIN Act-2002 defined indigenous people as “having its own mother 
language and traditional rites and customs, distinct cultural identity, distinct social 
structure and written or unwritten history” (NFDIN). The Interim Constitution was 
promulgated in 2007, which allowed “the inclusion of positive provisions to address 
indigenous peoples’ political, cultural, economical and social rights” (Sherpa et al. 
153). The Interim Constitution also declared that it would promote the political 
participation of marginalized and indigenous people at all levels (Sherpa et al. 155). 
Yet, indigenous leaders complained that representation in the Constituent Assembly 
was inadequate (UN General Assembly 15). The government officials recognized the 
need to promote the revision of existing legislation to conform to international 
agreements regarding the rights of indigenous people (8). The government 
acknowledges the necessity of improving the situation of indigenous people, but the 




 However, it seems difficult to achieve the improvement of the recognition to 
indigenous people due to the political instability continued from the late 1990s. Nepal 
experienced an insurgency led by the Maoists against the monarchy since 1996. The 
civil war between the Maoists and the government forces continued for a decade, and 
the country was driven into chaos at the time. Even though the peace accord was 
signed in 2006, the political situation has yet to become stable. As of April 2015, the 
government is still discussing a new constitution due to disagreement over federal 
restructuring (CIA “Nepal”).  
The political instability impacted government responses to the magnitude 7.8 
earthquake of April 25, 2015. Gabriel Domínguez reports that the authorities and 
energy services seemed to have been overwhelmed, and the preparation for the 
earthquake was not enough despite the fact that it was not unpredictable considering 
the geology of the country. The government admitted its insufficient preparation for 
the disaster. Moreover, the poor economic situation results in people living in houses 
with poor construction, and this led to the wide-spread destruction of buildings 
(Domínguez). The insufficient preparedness by the government may lead to the 
dissatisfaction of the people, which may perpetuate the instability of the country.  
The point in common between the government’s attempts to improve the 
situation of indigenous people and a lack of preparation for the earthquake is a lack of 
a strong initiative by the government due to the political instability. What should be 
emphasized in this section is that even though the government has tried to address the 
issues of indigenous peoples’ rights, such as attempting to promote indigenous 
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people’s participation in all tiers of the state asserted in the Interim Constitution 
(Sherpa et al. 155), the political and economic situation delays a solution to the issues.  
4.3.2. History of Forest Management Policies 
Even though the central government’s weakness negatively affects the full 
recognition to indigenous people, the situation is somewhat different in the context of 
forest management. The country has attempted to transfer the forest management 
rights to local communities. In this section, the policies that established community 
forest management systems will be analyzed. The land that is covered by forest in 
Nepal is, as explained, less than 30%. Forest resources are essential for the people as 
they use them as fuel wood, timber and fodder (FAO, Nepal 5). Because of this, 
deforestation has occurred rapidly. The forest land ratio was 38.0% in 1978/79, which 
decreased to 29.0% in 1990/91 (Sherpa et al. 145). Figure 5 shows the change of 
forest covered land from 1978 to 2010. The data of 2010 is an estimation cited from 
the Forest Resources Assessment published by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations.1 As shown, the land area covered by forest has been 
decreasing. 
The government nationalized the forests to manage them as national wealth 
which would benefit all citizens. Forests and forest resources were nationalized 
through the Private Forest Nationalization Act 1957 (Maharjan 35; Sherpa et al. 149). 
However, local people perceived it as if their forest use rights and customary law were  
                                                   
1 The actual data will be provided in the Forest Resources Assessment 2015, which is 
expected to be published in 2015. 
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Sources. World Bank. “Nepal.” The World Bank Group. 2015. Web. May 12. 2015. 
International Centre for Environmental Management, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, and School of Environmental Science and 
Management. Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment Report. 6 Aug. 2014. 
Web. 18 May. 2015. 
usurped by the government, which led to the weakening awareness of ownership and 
accountability in forest management (Maharjan 35-36). Moreover, the forests were 
converted into agricultural land: local communities intentionally cleared the forests 
and cultivated the land so that they could claim the land as their property (Sherpa et 
al. 149). Consequently, the forests decreased and degraded rapidly due to the fact that 
local people harvested as much as possible since the forests were open access 
(Maharjan 36; Sherpa et al. 149). In the late 1970s, the government officially admitted 
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dependent people (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 7). In response to the past failure of 
forest management, in 1988 the Master Plan for the Forestry Sector was introduced. It 
was to promote participation by local people in forest management (Dahal and 
Chapagain 66). 
The Forest Act 1993 significantly changed forest management in Nepal. It 
“provide[s] legal measures with aims to protect the forests and involve the local 
people in the conservation and development of forest resources” (Sherpa et al. 159). 
The main objective is “[t]o achieve sustainable management of forest resources by 
converting accessible national forests into Community Forests on a phase wise 
manner” (MoFSC “Community Forestry”). The forests in Nepal are being divided 
into community forests managed by local communities, and national forests managed 
by the Department of Forest and Soil Conservation (Maharjan 36). Forest Regulation 
1995 was also enacted to further promote the local communities’ access to forest 
resources (Sherpa et al. 159). The two regulations provide local communities 
significant rights of forest management. These include the right of self-governance of 
forests and the right to forest management and utilization (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre. 
8). To organize local communities, the Community Forest User Groups (CFUG) to 
participate in forest management, were formed. Nepal began to achieve sustainable 
forest management by implementing CFUGs and involving local communities which 





4.3.3. Community Forest Management Policies and Community Forest User 
Groups (CFUGs) 
 Due to the introduction of the CFUG system, Nepal is considered “a pioneer” 
of decentralization of forest management (SANDEE n.pag.). Community forestry is 
the second largest forest management entity in Nepal (UNEP). In fact, community 
forestry has improved the rural livelihoods in a number of communities, and 
promoted democracy at a local level (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 1). The success of 
establishing community forestry in Nepal is partly due to “the creation of appropriate 
institutional structures at local, meso, and national levels that included downward 
accountability and relatively unrestricted [decision-making] at the local level” (Ojha, 
Persha, and Chhatre 9). This section discusses what rights CFUGs are given and how 
CFUGs have improved local livelihoods and changed the country’s forest 
management. 
The Forest Act 1993 provides a number of rights to CFUGs. Table 3 
summarizes the rights and responsibilities of communities. As seen, CFUGs are 
entitled the rights of self-governance to forest practices and making decisions about 
their forest resources. After the long history of failure in forest management, the 
government has provided strong forest management rights to local communities. Yet, 
all of the forest land is still owned by the government. As of 2010, around one third of 
the total forests were managed by communities whereas most of the rest was managed 
by the government (REDD Desk “Statistics”). The number of CFUGs have continued 
to increase, and as of 2011, there were 17,685 CFUGs with 2,177,858 households 
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participating, and they managed a total of 1,652,654 hectares of forests (MoFSC 
“Community Forestry”).  
Table 3. Rights and responsibilities of CFUGs provided by the Forest Act 1993 
and Forest Regulation 1995 
Rights 
Rights to self-governance 
 Communities have rights to form CFUGs 
 Forest boundaries will not be restricted to existing administrative or political 
boundaries 
 CFUGs can decide executive committee members and revise their constitution 
anytime 
Rights to forest management 
 CFUGs can decide operational rules on protection, utilization, and infractions 
 Users can enter community forests as per rules 
 CFUGs can decide prices of forest products without intervention of the government 
 CFUGs can operate enterprises and make profits 
 CFUGs can decide which area, persons or development activities they invest 
Responsibilities 
 Users have to pay a membership fee 
 CFUGs have to pay taxes to the government for their external profits gained from 
their forest products 
 Users have to participate in meetings 
 Users should join obligatory community activities which are: tree planting, thinning, 
and so on 
Sources: Ojha, Hemant, and Lauren Persha, and Ashwini Chhatre. "Community 
Forestry in Nepal: A Policy Innovation for Local Livelihoods." IFPRI Discussion 
Paper 913. 2009. Web. 13 May. 2015, South Asian Network for Development and 
Environment Economics. “Community Forestry in Nepal Management Rules and 
Distribution of Benefits.” Policy Brief 1-04. N.pag. March 2004. Web. 13 May. 2015. 
 In order to form community forestry, it is necessary to involve forest user 
groups (FUG) and the staff of the District Forest Office (DFO) and NGOs, as 
supporters (Ito et al. 454). When a group of households want to form a CFUG, they 
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have to prepare a constitution under the provisions of the Act and submit it to the local 
DFO (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 3). CFUG members share rules and ideas on 
community forest management while they learn from DFO staff members objectives 
and significance of forest management and are provided technical assistance by 
NGOs for forest management (Ito et al. 454 : Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 3). Ito et al. 
argue that the formation process is the most important step of community forestry (Ito 
et al. 454). The right to self-governance starts from the formation of a group and 
designing a constitution. The structure promotes active involvement of local 
community members who wish to form CFUGs. This is significant because it gives 
more opportunities to local communities to learn the mechanism and practice of forest 
management. 
CFUGs manage forests to benefit the members’ livelihoods. In addition, they 
have become “a local agency for community development, social inclusion, and 
democratic civic engagement” (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 5). Hemant Ojha, Lauren 
Persha, and Ashwini Chhatre report that they identified development in infrastructure, 
such as the improvement of irrigation canals and water distribution and construction 
of public buildings by using forest products through CFUG activities (5). Ganga Ram 
Dahal and Apsara Chapagain agree. They state that many CFUGs improved public 
services in the local communities by using income from the sale and distribution of 
forest products. For example, Prajapati Forest Use Group built a connecting road from 
the village to the highway, and Sati Karnali Forest User Group started operating an 
ambulance service in its area (Dahal and Chapagain 74). CFUGs have played an 
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important role in initiating development of social services essential for improving 
local communities’ welfare. 
 Furthermore, Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre and Dahal and Chapagain state that 
CFUGs have contributed to poverty alleviation. Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre indicate 
how CFUGs have impacted the livelihoods of 2,700 households from 26 CFUGs. 
Even though the authors acknowledged the limited certainty over the outcomes due to 
issues of research design, they found that 46% of the households improved their status 
to better well-being categories through participating in CFUGs that supported 
livelihood improvement and capacity-building activities between 2002 and 2008. For 
example, citing the research conducted by Chapagain and Banjade, Ojha, Persha, and 
Chhatre found that among the ethnic minorities originally categorized as relatively 
very poor, 36% of them improved to relative poor. On the other hand, few of the 
households changed to a lower status (Ojha, Persha, and Chhatre 13-14). Another 
study found that CFUG members’ annual household income increased by 113 percent 
on average between 2003 and 2008. Even though the research did not prove that the 
income increase was solely attributed to CFUG activities (13), it is worth considering 
the positive impacts on households.  
In addition, Dahal and Chapagain state that CFUGs have been making an 
effort to establish more beneficial activities to poor households, such as free forest 
provision of forest products to poor households in Bans Bari Forest User Group and 
allocation of a part of the funds from income-generating activities for them in 
Gyansee Forest User Group (Dahal and Chapagain 74-75). These indicate the 
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possibility that CFUGs have worked positively in terms of poverty alleviation and 
livelihood improvement. This result can motivate other local community members to 
actively participate in CFUGs since they are likely to get higher income from CFUGs.  
The success of CFUGs is acknowledged at the international level. For 
example, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) regards CFUGs as a 
success story, citing their contribution to income generation from forest production 
and nature conservation. Also, the UNEP states that community forestry induces 
inclusive growth by, for example, initiating a scholarship program for low income 
people (UNEP).  
However, even though CFUGs are recognized as a successful case of 
community forest management, there are some problems reported. This includes 
exclusion of some households within a CFUG, depending on one’s caste status, 
conflicting interests of resource use, and unequal offering of labor by individuals 
(Maharjan 37). Yet, the research conducted by Maharjan also found that both annual 
entitlement of forest products and animal holding in 2000 increased in all ethnic/caste 
group except one group compared to those of in 1990 (38). How to improve the 
situation will be a key for further development of CFUGs. 
4.3.4. REDD+ Projects from the Official Position 
 Community forest management in Nepal has a relatively long history. 
CFUGs are also involved in REDD+ projects, and in this section, the official position 
on the implementation is analyzed.  
 Nepal became a member of the FCPF in 2008 and the UN-REDD 
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Programme in 2010. The UN-REDD Programme provides targeted support in 
establishing the design of an effective, efficient, and equitable fund management 
system for the government of Nepal. The Programme also assesses policies and 
measures for addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. The FCPF 
supports the country’s capacity development process on overall REDD+ Readiness 
(UN-REDD “Nepal”).  
 The government states that “Nepal has always shown her commitment to 
meet international obligations” and it “has been working on the REDD process 
through the support of various donors and funding organizations” (Nepal, REDD+ in 
Nepal n.pag.). The government established a three-tiered structure for REDD 
coordination: the Apex Body (REDD+ Multi-sectoral, Multi-stakeholder Coordinating 
and Monitoring Committee); the operational level institution (REDD+ Working 
Group (RWG)); and the coordinating entity (the REDD-Forestry and Climate Change 
Cell) (ICEM Asia et al. 122). The REDD-Forestry and Climate Change Cell (REDD 
Cell) stated in the Country Progress Sheet submitted to the FCPF that indigenous 
people are engaged in all the tiers, and Dalit (untouchable caste) in Multi-stakeholder 
Forum (Nepal, REDD+ Annual 5). In the report, the REDD Cell emphasizes the 
involvement of indigenous people, which is consistently shown in other reports 
(discussed shortly) submitted by the institution. The inclusion of indigenous people is 
also identified by scholars who conducted field research on REDD+ projects in Nepal, 
which will be discussed in the later section. 
Nepal has a number of institutions to support implementing REDD+ other 
98 
 
than the REDD Cell. For example, the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation 
(MoFSC) is the leading institution that undertakes REDD+ Readiness activities and 
holds responsibility for coordinating REDD+ (MoFSC “Introduction”; ICEM Asia et 
al. 123). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is a supporting institution for the MoFSC, 
and the Department of Forests (DoF) is the largest department of the MoFSC 
implementing REDD+ at the district level through DFO (ICEM Asia et al. 123). The 
MoFSC aims to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation “by 
addressing the [livelihood] concerns of poor and socially marginalized forest 
dependent people, and by establishing effective policy, regulatory and institutional 
structures for sustainable development of Nepal’s forests under the forthcoming new 
constitutional framework” (MoFSC “Introduction”). International Centre for 
Environmental Management Asia et al. lists twenty one institutions including 
governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations that operate in the 
forest sector (123-26), showing the Nepal’s high interests in and commitment to 
REDD+. 
 The REDD Cell is also an important institution. The REDD Cell has been 
established to coordinate the REDD+ readiness process under the FCPF and other 
REDD+ projects (Forestry Nepal). The officers of the REDD Cell participate in 
national and international conferences, training activities, and workshops that enhance 
their knowledge and skills to initiate REDD+ readiness processes. However, one staff 
expressed doubts about their capacity to effectively take part in REDD+. Due to the 
fact that REDD+ is a new idea, the staff need time to understand the issues (ICEM 
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Asia et al. 123). The REDD Cell conducted research on REDD+ pilot projects in 
Nepal and reports that the five pilot projects positively impacted on the mobilization 
of the Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN), indigenous 
communities, and women and Dalits (ICEM Asia et al. 89), which was confirmed by 
other scholars (see Maraseni et al.; Shrestha et al.). In the report, the REDD Cell 
analyzed the five pilot projects, which are: Design and establishment of a Governance 
and Payment System for Community Forest Management under REDD+; REDD-
Reducing Poverty in Nepal; Plan Vivo; Grassroots Level Capacity Building on 
REDD+ in Asia and the Pacific; and Climate Change and Partnership Programme.  
All of the five projects except REDD-Reducing Poverty in Nepal targeted 
either CFUGs or indigenous people. Due to their relevancy, I will pay particular 
attention to the Grassroots Capacity Building Programme and the Climate Change and 
Partnership Programme. The Grassroots Capacity Building Programme involved 
sixteen districts and targeted CFUGs, local stakeholders, civil society, and other 
groups. The Climate Change and Partnership Programme covered forty districts 
mostly from mid-hills and Terai region and involved indigenous people in the project 
areas (ICEM Asia et al. 121). To analyze the two projects from the official position 
will reveal the scope of the projects and how they addressed local community 
members’ rights, motivated them for REDD+ implementation, and utilized the CFUG 
system. 
The Grassroots Capacity Building Programme was launched in August 2009, 
and it was implemented originally in three countries: Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Nepal. 
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The goal of this Programme is to ensure that the grassroots forest sector stakeholders 
contribute to the success of REDD+ and receive benefits for local socio-economic 
development (Nepal, Study 15). The Programme is expected to be inclusive and 
participatory in every process of planning and implementation (Nepal, Study 16). The 
awareness of the stakeholders at grassroots level towards REDD+ has been raised 
through training programs (RECOFTC 8). The training was carried out in the forms of 
knowledge sharing events, street play, puppet shows, and so on. The Programme has 
created a number of materials for stakeholders’ learning, such as training manuals, 
question and answer booklets, and so on (RECOFTC 2). However, the languages used 
were only the national language, Nepali, and English. The absence of local language 
materials were recognized by the government (Nepal, Study 18), but those were not 
translated in the project. Instead, the issue was treated as lessons learnt (32). 
Nepal involved more than 20,000 individual stakeholders to community level 
awareness raising events from 2010 to 2012. The next largest number was Lao PDR, 
with 3,770 participants from 2011-12 (RECOFTC 10). The REDD Cell states that the 
Programme has a means to smooth implementation since the Programme has been 
implemented through FECOFUN, which has a wide network. Moreover, it argues that 
the Programme in Nepal “can be considered as pioneer in developing training manual 
for developing overall awareness on REDD+ plus, trainers and creating awareness at 
community level” (Nepal, Study 17). The REDD Cell indicates the issues of the 
Programme, such as the small scale of the pilot area and weak coordination with other 
projects. However, the REDD Cell did not recognize any issue related to community 
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participation. Rather, it found that trainers have involved the communities for raising 
awareness on REDD+, indigenous people and Dalits participated in training and 
workshops, and an effective coordination among CFUGs (18). All of the analysis by 
the REDD Cell on the Programme indicates its positive attitude towards the 
Programme in terms of the involvement of local communities, especially CFUGs, and 
its expectation to the role of CFUGs as effective units of REDD+ implementation. 
Another programme is the Climate Change and Partnership Programme 
carried out by the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) in 
partnership with the IWGIA, Asia Indigenous People’s Pact (AIPP), and Indigenous 
Peoples’ International Centre for Policy Research and Education (REDD Desk 
“Climate Change”). The Programme was launched in 2009, and the goal was to 
“contribute to the development and implementation of approaches in national REDD 
strategies that take both long-term forest conservation and the rights and concerns of 
indigenous peoples into account” (IWGIA and AIPP 1). The Programme was 
implemented in the same three countries as the Grassroots Capacity Building 
Programme and Vietnam. The Programme aims to increase awareness on climate 
change and capacity building of indigenous people for community-based forest 
management and to promote REDD+ partnership between other stakeholders (Nepal, 
Study 19). The Programme carried out Training on Trainers (ToT) at the national and 
sub-national level, development of education materials of REDD+, and development 
of training manual for indigenous people, among others (19). The REDD Cell stated 
that NEFIN’s network with indigenous peoples made it easy to plan and implement 
102 
 
the Programme, and the network contributed to effective project activities (20). 
Moreover, it reports that NEFIN members understood that REDD+ impacts on 
indigenous people’s rights and responsibilities (22). The Climate Change and 
Partnership Programme only targeted indigenous people, an important component of 
CFUGs. Therefore, the Programme is critical for improving the rights of indigenous 
people by providing knowledge and training. 
Overall, the REDD Cell concluded that in most of the five projects, training 
of local leaders on social and technical aspects of REDD+ has been successful, noting 
that the projects’ coverage was limited. Also, it states that CFUGs, REDD+ networks 
and partners are well coordinated (23). The REDD Cell emphasized the strong 
networks connecting local stakeholders and supportive organizations and the 
necessity to establish the interconnection among projects. The REDD Cell is satisfied 
with the projects’ involvement of local communities to promote their understanding of 
REDD+ for active participation in REDD+ projects. Its expectation of the networks 
held by CFUGs and other institutions, such as NEFIN, is enormous since those 
connections can be utilized for national REDD+ strategy development and 
implementation. This is how the REDD Cell, a leading institution of REDD+ projects 
in Nepal, considered how community participation is addressed in the projects. In the 






4.4. REDD+ Projects from the Local Community Perspective 
 From the government’s perspective, it emphasizes that the REDD+ project 
implementation has been effectively involving local communities and utilizing CFUG 
and other local entities’ networks. In this section, the actual involvement of local 
communities will be discussed by analyzing secondary data, mainly scholars’ field 
research on pilot project areas. The research shows that community members were 
participating in the REDD+ projects, such as meetings and monitoring activities, 
which indicates their effective involvement in REDD+. The success of community 
forest management and CFUGs in Nepal is evaluated by scholars (Nawir et al.; 
Bluffstone, Robinson, and Guthiga; Maraseni et al.), and they conclude that the legal 
basis of community forestry can be a basis to secure communities’ share of REDD+ 
funds (Nawir et al. 2). 
Harisharan Luintel et al. argue that capacity building at grassroots level is 
particularly crucial for REDD+ implementation since it “has to be implemented in a 
complex local environment, shaped by multiple land use systems, sharply divided 
politics, conflicting policies, different levels of forest dependencies of communities, 
complex social relations, unclear governance and tenure structures, and differential 
climate impacts” (2). In the context of Nepal, the key factors that affect the REDD+ 
implementation are the high importance of forest and forest resources for forest 
dependent people, CFUGs that are legally entitled the right to self-governance by the 
state government, and vulnerability to climate impacts due to varying altitudes. In 
Nepal, capacity building of the community members is extremely important for 
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REDD+ implementation, considering the CFUGs’ effectiveness and efficiency in 
forest management. 
In capacity building projects, FECOFUN, Himalaya Grassroots Women’s 
Natural Resource Management Association (HIMAWANTI), and NEFIN actively take 
an initiative (Luintel et al. 5), promoting local communities, women, and indigenous 
people to be engaged in the projects and protect their rights in REDD+ 
implementation. Rabindra Roy et al. confirmed the effective methods to increase the 
understanding of local community members in the Grassroots Capacity Building 
Programme by interviewing grassroots stakeholders, government and NGO officials, 
civil societies, CFUGs, and indigenous people organizations (2). The authors 
introduce the voice of a member of FECOFUN; “partnership with FECOFUN is an 
effective way of integrating global knowledge of climate change and REDD+ into the 
local context and build understanding accordingly, which can be disseminated at 
grassroots level quickly” (Roy et al. 3). Moreover, the authors state that collaboration 
between local institutions such as FECOFUN and district and local government was 
confirmed (Roy et al. 3-4). The Programme offered opportunities for local community 
members to learn the concepts of climate change and REDD+, local institutions to 
interact with local government, and the cooperation among local institutions for 
efficient project implementation. The report is consistent with those of the 
government in terms of community participation: grassroots capacity building and 
awareness raising projects are successful in Nepal. 
 Peter Newton et al. state that the most holistic pilot project in Nepal is the 
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“Design and Establishment of a Governance and Payment System for Community 
Forest Management under REDD+”, also known as the Forest Carbon Trust Fund 
(FCTF) project, implemented between 2009 and 2013 (29). The project was carried 
out in the watershed of Charnawati River in Dolakha District, Ludikhola River in 
Gorkha District and Kayarkhola River in Chitwan District. The project covered more 
than 10,000 ha with 112 community forests and 90,000 forest users. The Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) has distributed seed grants to 
CFUGs. The aims of the project were “to demonstrate an innovative mechanism for 
governance and benefit sharing of REDD+ payments in the community forestry 
sector” (Shrestha et al. 2427). The project implementation process included awareness 
raising and capacity building of stakeholders, base line survey, methodology 
designing and testing, and finalizing methodologies and sharing (Nepal, Study 5). The 
major activities included designing an equitable payment system and an efficient 
reporting system, and the operationalization of a REDD+ governance and payment 
system for a sample communities (5-6). 
 As a result of the implementation, the number of women and socially 
marginalized communities participating in the executive committees increased 
(Shrestha et al. 2430; Maraseni et al. 43). Moreover, the benefit distribution system 
effectively addressed marginalized people. The benefit distribution system adopted a 
multi-criteria approach based on performance and socio-economic variables (Shrestha 
et al. 2431; Nawir et al. 4). 40% of the payment to CFUGs was based on the amount 
of carbon successfully stored and sequestered. 60% was paid depending on the ratio 
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of participation of indigenous people (10%), Dalits (15%), women (15%), and poor 
households (20%) (Shrestha et al. 2431). The total payments in three years were USD 
285,000, and among that, the project provided indigenous people households USD 
26,330, Dalits and women USD 39,495 each, and poor households USD 52,660. For 
community forests’ carbon stock and carbon increment, it provided USD 63,192 and 
USD 42,128, respectively (2432). This approach was to make sure that participation 
of marginalized people received recognition by payments to some extent, even if they 
did not achieve high performance in carbon sequestration (2431). In fact, CFUGs 
devoted most of the fund to pro-poor activities including income-generating activities, 
support for poor and under-resourced students, and loans for the members who want 
to work abroad (Maraseni et al. 42). Moreover, Shrestha et al. report that carbon 
sequestration in the three pilot areas increased between 10 and 33 t/ha over three years 
(2434).The benefit distribution system provided social benefits as well as introduced 
performance-based incentives to the participant communities (Newton et al. 30).  
However, using the NORAD example, Ani Adiwinata Nawir et al. indicate 
that sustainability of the scheme, especially in terms of funding, is a major challenge. 
The funding from NORAD to the project was a three year contract, and as of February 
2015, the funding ended and thus there was no money to pay the stakeholders (Nawir 
et al. 5). Maraseni et al. also indicate that the cost in time and money that community 
members spent on the REDD+ activities were more than the payments they received 
(43), which may reduce the local community members’ motivation for the projects. 
Participating in REDD+ means that local community members gave up using forests 
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and forest resources or harvesting to make profits. The local community members 
should be compensated for the opportunity costs generated by REDD+ 
implementation. 
The studies on the “Design and Establishment of a Governance and Payment 
System for Community Forest Management under REDD+” indicates the potential of 
REDD+ to promote active participation of indigenous people, women, Dalits, and 
other marginalized people by devising the variables calculated for the payments. This 
ultimately may reduce poverty among marginalized people. In addition, since the 
project has utilized the CFUGs (the groups created for community management), it 
made it easier to adopt REDD+ projects. However, a new wrinkle that has appeared 
due to CFUGs’ positive role in implementing the project is that the payment may not 
be sufficient relative to the time and money local members have to spend on REDD+ 
activities given the lack of secure and continual funding. 
Overall, the REDD+ pilot projects in Nepal were found to involve local 
community members. The projects were devised to promote indigenous people, 
women, Dalits, and other marginalized people to participate in the meetings and 
monitoring. Moreover, an important fact of the case in Nepal is that the BDS is 
already tested in some pilot projects. The payments were based both on performance 
and the extent to which marginalized people participated in the projects. The future 
challenge is to sustain the participation of those people so that the system will not be 
used to get more benefits without actual participation of them. Furthermore, ensuring 
sufficient funding is another challenge that Nepal has to deal with. However, 
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insufficient funds have been an issue at the international level discussion, thus Nepal 
has to cooperate with other international institutions to solve the problem. 
4.5. Summary 
 In this chapter, the REDD+ implementation in Nepal in terms of community 
participation was discussed. The political history was introduced to suggest Nepal’s 
long journey to achieve democracy, which is still under way. The history of the 
recognition process of the indigenous peoples by the government, with highlighting 
the continual instability of the government, reveals its ongoing process to fully 
acknowledge the rights of indigenous peoples.  
 The government’s handover of the forest management right to local 
communities has been recognized internationally as a successful case of community 
forest management. It was innovative at the time that the government admitted its 
failure of forest management and offered the management and control rights on forest 
to local communities. Even though the CFUGs have to consult with the DFO staff, the 
right to self-governance and benefit from forest and forest resources has increased 
local community members’ recognition of the ownership of forests. Also, CFUGs 
have promoted democracy at the local level. Community forest management has 
achieved reduction in deforestation and poverty. Critiques indicate the exclusion of 
marginalized people, but it is widely recognized and started to be improved, as seen in 
REDD+ projects in the country. 
 The government emphasizes its active involvement in REDD+ and 
established well-organized institutions, such as the REDD Cell. Moreover, the 
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government promised that it would address the issues of poverty of marginalized 
people. The pilot projects were implemented for capacity building and awareness 
raising at the grassroots level, and the REDD Cell confirmed the engagement of local 
community members. The projects efficiently utilized the CFUGs and CFUG 
networks for the projects. Scholars also confirm the active participation of local 
communities. Indigenous people, women, and Dalits were encouraged to join 
meetings. The BDS adopted both the performance-based and rights-based approaches 
so that the participation of those people was ensured. The problem is not a lack of 
community participation, but rather to assure sustainable funding. Even though the 
motivation of local communities to REDD+ projects is high, insufficient payments 
may cause their reluctance to further participate in the projects. In the next section, the 
comparative analysis between Vietnam and Nepal will be discussed. The focus is on 
the causes of a lack of community participation in Vietnam with analyzing the factors 





 Both in Vietnam and Nepal, forests are owned by the government, and rights 
of management of parts of the forests are allocated to local communities and 
individual households. However, while REDD+ in Nepal successfully involves 
community people in the implementation processes, REDD+ in Vietnam maintains a 
top-down decision-making manner that excludes community participation. The chief 
differences between the two countries are mainly the historical attitudes of the 
governments towards indigenous people and the extent to which the government has 
power to control the people. Moreover, the history of forest policies has set the stage 
for the relationship between forest management systems and indigenous people. In 
Nepal, the introduction of CFM enhanced local community members’ participation in 
forest management, while the government of Vietnam maintained centralized forest 
management. This chapter analyses forest management and REDD+ in the two 
countries. 
5.1. Governments’ Control over Forests and the People 
The government of Vietnam maintains tight control on rights of forest 
management since a large part of the forests are allocated to SFEs and SOCs, which 
then are given to individual households through forest contracts. Historically, the 
government did not recognize indigenous people, whom it calls ‘ethnic minorities,’ 
and assimilation policies imposed on them in the past continue to influence the 
livelihoods of these indigenous people. The government’s uncompromising attitude 
towards indigenous people is also shown in its lack of respect for long-standing 
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indigenous customary law. This has been a problem long before REDD+ projects 
were launched, and although the government acknowledges the importance of 
protecting the rights of indigenous people, this is not necessarily reflected in the forest 
policies. However, Vietnam has taken initiative for REDD+ implementation, 
including the role of the first implementer of Phase II in UN-REDD projects. REDD+ 
in Vietnam consequently inherited the issue that the government neglected to solve. 
In addition to the government ignoring customary law, the quality of the 
lands allocated to individuals and households is another problem that should be 
emphasized in REDD+ implementation. High quality land is allocated to 
governmental management boards and state-owned companies while poor quality 
land is allocated to individual households. 
In spite of the government’s failure to integrate or incorporate customary law 
into statutory law and inequitable land allocation to individual households, Vietnam is 
considered to be a pioneer of REDD+ projects. Why are the UN-REDD Programme 
and the FCPF promoting new pilot projects in Vietnam despite non-participation of 
indigenous people, who are one of the essential stakeholders of the projects? I suggest 
that this is because the combination of the neoliberal idea of REDD+ and the central 
authority of the government of Vietnam.  
I stated earlier that REDD+ and carbon markets were created under a 
neoliberal-dominated agenda that was led by the First World. Carbon markets were 
made for the First World to decrease their obligation to reduce CO2 emissions through 
pressuring the Third World to increase emission reductions and join carbon trading. 
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The Indigenous Peoples Biocultural Climate Change Assessment (IPCCA), an 
international organization pursuing indigenous research, declared that “REDD+ is a 
neo-liberal, market-driven approach that leads to the commodification of life and 
undermines holistic community values and governance” and that “REDD+ threatens 
the survival of Indigenous Peoples” (Lang n.pag.). By its very nature, REDD+ 
commodifies the environment. However, in the environment it commodifies, there are 
people who rely on forests and forest resources for their livelihoods. REDD+ 
apparently recognizes the necessity of protecting their rights; however, its priority is 
still on climate change mitigation, and ultimately, benefits from the carbon markets. 
Therefore, protection of local livelihoods remains unachieved. This is problematic 
since indigenous people have less voice at the international level than other 
stakeholders of REDD+, such as government officials, the private sector, and NGOs. 
This structural problem makes it difficult to truly focus on protecting the rights of 
indigenous people and further marginalizes them from decision-making processes. 
In addition to the neoliberal nature of REDD+, the government of Vietnam 
maintains top-down decision-making processes that discourage local participation. As 
discussed previously, the government controls mass media. In order to analyze the 
extent to which the government influences decision-making processes of policy 
events, Pham Thu Thuy et al. conducted research on how different stakeholders were 
involved in the processes. The policy events studied were: Decision No. 380/Decree 
No. 99; the establishment of the UN-REDD program in Vietnam; and the creation of 
REDD+ subtechnical working groups. The researchers conclude that participation 
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does not necessarily mean involvement in decision-making processes, and found that 
many international NGOs (INGOs) and donors answered that they only had a limited 
political influence and were not involved in decision-making processes of the 
Decision and Decree (Pham et al. “REDD+” n.pag.). Interviewees from NGOs, 
INGOs, donors, and the business sector answered that the Decision and Decree were 
formed in top-down processes led by the central government (ibid). Furthermore, 
Pham et al. found that there were no representatives of indigenous people in the 
consultation processes and local NGOs had a limited influence. This power structure 
of decision-making processes did not fully reflect opinions of institutions other than 
the government. This might have made it possible to make decisions in a simple and 
easy way for the government, and thus Vietnam became the first country which 
launched some of the important REDD+ projects, but this ultimately caused the 
REDD+ projects in Vietnam to proceed without indigenous peoples’ opinions. I argue 
that the fact that the top-down approach, which lacks other stakeholders’ opinions, 
causes the speedy policy decisions by the government in REDD+ policy making and 
that the government’s historical attitude that does not recognize ethnic minorities as 
indigenous people ultimately makes it possible to implement REDD+ projects as a 
pioneer in the country. The reliance of UN-REDD Programme and other international 
institutions on Vietnam comes from this very characteristic of the government of 
Vietnam: the tight control on the people and the top-down approach to indigenous 
people.  
The situation differs in Nepal. There, the Constitution declared that the 
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country is multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, and the government has recognized 
indigenous people. This is strikingly different from Vietnam, which has not 
recognized people living in forests as indigenous people but as ethnic minorities, the 
definition of which does not recognize the traditional and cultural values of the 
people.  
Another difference between the governments of Vietnam and Nepal is 
stability of the government. In Vietnam, the government maintains a tight control on 
the people; however, in Nepal, the government is unstable, which causes a delay of 
adopting a new constitution. The failure of the government recognizing the rights of 
indigenous people, though it does recognize their existence, is attributed to its 
instability and that delays the creation of a new constitution. 
Community forest management means less influence by the central 
government. Local communities promote self-governance of their forest resources, 
cooperating with local governments. In addition to this characteristic of CFM, the 
central government being weak might have enhanced local community members’ 
exercise of their rights on forests and forest resources. The major differences between 
Vietnam and Nepal are their legal recognition of the people living in forests (‘ethnic 
minorities’ in Vietnam and ‘indigenous people’ in Nepal), and the political stability. 
The differences between the governments cause different influences on forests and 
forest land that ultimately decides the extent to which indigenous people can enjoy 




5.2. Governments and Forest Policies 
 Both Vietnam and Nepal had nationalized forest land and experienced 
deforestation and forest degradation. Both countries’ state forestry policies have 
failed; in Vietnam, it was “a disaster for Vietnam’s forest resources” and forest cover 
decreased at 3% per year between 1973 and 1985 (Sikor 1). In Nepal, local 
communities did not regard the forests as their property and started to exploit forests 
and forest resources. However, after acknowledging deforestation and forest 
degradation, the two countries adopted different policies on land and forests which led 
to different outcomes. Nepal launched CFM, which succeeded in increasing forest 
cover and income generation, in part by making local communities stakeholders in the 
process. On the other hand, in Vietnam, the state has continued state-owned forestry 
that excludes indigenous people from decision-making processes. 
 In Nepal, the government admitted its failure in sustainable forest 
management and launched CFM with devolving a large part of management rights. 
Even though the area covered by CFUGs is limited (around one third of the country), 
the positive outcome of CFM is evident. Unlike Vietnam, forest cover continues to 
decline, but the rate of deforestation has also slightly decreased since the introduction 
of CFM. The REDD+ projects in Nepal utilized the basis of CFM, and it turned out to 
be evident that the system works well. This implies that it is not REDD+ itself but 
rather CFUGs that succeeded in promoting community participation in REDD+ 
projects. The decision of the government to devolve the forest management rights to 
indigenous people ultimately led to the positive role of CFUGs in REDD+, which is 
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not seen in Vietnam. 
On the other hand, in Vietnam, land redistribution had disregarded traditional 
land use and territories of indigenous people in rural areas and implemented policies 
to incorporate them into free markets and globalization. As a result, Vietnam has 
achieved rapid economic growth. The GDP increased from 6.3 billion USD in 1989 to 
171 billion USD in 2013 with the annual growth rate between 5-8% (World Bank 
“Vietnam”). This economic growth succeeded, in part, by sacrificing indigenous 
people’s traditional cultures: they were forced to change their lifestyles, abandon 
tradition, and adopt the national economic-centered policies.  
At the same time, Vietnam succeeded in increasing forest cover. However, in 
fact, this success is built upon the increasing importation of forest products from 
abroad. Patrick Meyfroidt and Eric Lambin reported in 2009 that the displacement of 
forest exploitation to abroad accounted for about 39% of the regrowth of forests 
between 1987 and 2006 (“Displacement” 16139). This is due to the governmental 
policies to severely restrict domestic logging, and this caused an increase of illegal 
logging mainly in Cambodia and Laos (ibid). Vietnam (illegally) imports wood, and 
the amount of export value-added to processed wood, such as furniture, has been 
rapidly increasing since the 2000s (16140-41). In fact, Vietnam should not be 
considered a successful case of increasing forest cover. Rather, the country has 
displaced deforestation to other countries for achieving both economic growth and 
stopping local deforestation. This is one of the problems that REDD+ has, which is 
leakage, explained in the second chapter. Although Vietnam is promoting REDD+ 
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projects, it imports wood including illegal products that caused deforestation of other 
countries. Dealing with this issue is as important as processing REDD+ projects in 
Vietnam. 
5.3. REDD+, Governments and Indigenous People 
 It became clear that both in Vietnam and Nepal, existing forest management 
systems and policies significantly influence the REDD+ project implementation. In 
Vietnam, there are a number of pilot projects aiming to enhance indigenous people. 
Some projects, such as the FPIC projects, specifically emphasize the necessity of local 
participation. Yet, there are relatively fewer organizations engaged in capacity 
building for enhancing social safeguards in Vietnam, and most of the project activities 
on capacity building for social safeguards are at national and sub-national level 
(Stephenson et al. 14). On the other hand, a number of organizations, including 
government agencies, NGOs, and academic institutions, are involved in capacity 
building for REDD+ policy making (12). This implies the Vietnamese government’s 
emphasis on, or the government’s priority of, a national level REDD+ capacity 
building rather than empowering the awareness of indigenous people.  
 Additionally, even though the government recognizes the protection of forest 
and forest land rights of indigenous people and implements grassroots capacity 
building projects, the core of the issue of absence of local participation is rooted not in 
a lack of knowledge about REDD+ by indigenous people but in forest policies that the 
government has set. Vietnam has a long history of assimilation of indigenous people 
into the dominant Kinh, and the government did not accept the inherent tradition and 
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culture. As a result, customary land tenure was not incorporated into statutory law, 
which caused the current conflict between the government and indigenous people on 
land boundaries. Moreover, the government assigned high quality land to state 
agencies. Individuals have to deal with complex and cumbersome processes to 
contract the forest management rights with state agencies. Therefore, the government 
should not only promote REDD+ activities but also reconsider the regulations of 
forest land boundaries and forest contracts. 
 In Nepal, even though the efforts are not enough to fully recognize the 
indigenous people’s rights, the government acknowledges the necessity of 
empowering indigenous people. The introduction of CFUGs promoted self-
governance, which enhances the participation in decision-making processes of 
indigenous people within their respective CFUGs. Although there is still an issue of a 
lack of participation of women and indigenous people within CFUGs and 
improvement of their status is necessary, CFM successfully raise awareness of their 
responsibilities on forest management. 
 We can analyze the differences between the two countries by utilizing the 
idea of “stakeholders”. The UN-REDD and the FCPF define stakeholders as “those 
groups that have a stake/interest/right in the forest and those that will be affected 
either negatively or positively by REDD+ activities” (1). They explicitly state that the 
definition includes indigenous people. Therefore, indigenous people in Vietnam and 
Nepal are clearly stakeholders of REDD+ projects. As discussed, historically, the 
government of Nepal regarded indigenous people as stakeholders in forest 
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management by allowing them to form CFUGs, while the government of Vietnam 
maintained powerful control of forest management after both countries witnessed 
domestic deforestation and forest degradation. The governmental document of 
REDD+ in Vietnam promises that special efforts to ensure participation of ethnic 
minorities, with recognizing them as stakeholders, would be made in Phase II of the 
Programme (UN-REDD, UN-REDD Viet Nam, 55). However, considering its long 
history of assimilation of indigenous people, whether they will be provided proper 
information of project implementation and contracts, and regarded as stakeholders, 
who have a right to participate in and benefit from the projects, are not clear. 
5.4. Devolution or Recentralization? 
 Devolution of forest control was the first step of successful CFM in Nepal. 
“[D]ecentralized forest management system at the local level… is one of the most 
effective forest governance systems in developing countries” (Neupane and Shrestha 
72). However, REDD+ can cause recentralization of forest management since its 
mechanism is financially driven. The government may capture most of the benefits 
generated by the project implementation, and therefore, REDD+ may make the poor 
forest dependent people worse off (ibid). In the case of Vietnam, the tight control of 
the central government may cause the capture of the majority of benefits from 
REDD+ and lead to limited distribution of the benefits to local community members 
who actually implement the projects. 
REDD+ may negatively affect communities if the tenure rights of the 
communities are not clear (Neupane and Shrestha 78). Therefore, in Vietnam, which 
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has marked discrepancies between customary law and statutory law, communities 
may be excluded from benefit distribution or provided limited benefits with limited 
use of forest resources.  
The issue of recentralization of forest management systems potentially 
influences local communities in Nepal as well. Bluffstone, Robinson, and Guthiga 
indicate that REDD+ may negatively impact poor people in terms of access to forest 
products, public transportation and fairness (47). The possibility of recentralization of 
forest management should be investigated at the international level to remove the 
threat of benefit hijacking by the state governments. 
5.5. Benefit Distribution System 
The Vietnamese government has experiences of PES other than REDD+. 
Based on its experiences, the government has launched the establishment of a sound 
BDS of REDD+. It states that PES is a new idea and further research is needed to 
apply it to REDD+ BDS, but it seems that PES will become one of the core 
components of organizing BDS. What has to be kept in mind when elaborating 
REDD+ BDS is shown by Pham. He indicates the problems of the absence of local 
community members in decision-making of contracts. I argue that this is attributed to 
the members’ lack of knowledge of PES and other related information, and 
fundamentally, a lack of education of local community members is what influences 
their understanding on the climate change mitigation mechanisms. In fact, low 
standard education levels in the villages of Lam Dong, one of the pilot areas of 
REDD+, is reported (Enright 6). This suggests the possibility of people’s inability to 
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understand REDD+ and REDD+ BDS.  
On the other hand, in Nepal, although the projects were pilot level, they 
achieved equitable payment systems at a local level. The FCTF pilot project used a 
nested approach for the financial transfers, which made it possible to provide funds 
from the central to community level (Shrestha et al. 2431). The payments were not 
only performance-based but were also right-based, which successfully emphasized the 
rights of marginalized people, including indigenous people, and provided them 
payments. The success of piloting BDS is largely attributed to the existence of 
CFUGs, which have sufficient experiences of forest management, self-governance, 
and cooperation with government officials. Future REDD+ BDS projects should focus 
on how to ensure sufficient funds for benefit distributions at the local level, since their 
cost of participating in REDD+ projects (in terms of lost opportunities) were found to 
be more than they receive from the projects. 
What should be emphasized is that there are no clear standards of benefits 
that local communities can receive by REDD+ implementation at the international 
level. Also, who and how to receive benefits remains controversial, and REDD+ 
continues to focus on the national level (Neupane and Shrestha 78). The experience of 
BDS is different from country to country, such as PES in Vietnam and CFM in Nepal, 
which means there are different solutions in each country. How to make use of their 





5.6. Community Participation and Community Forest Management 
 Utilizing existing CFUGs in Nepal makes it easier for REDD+ to organize 
local community members and encourage them to participate in the projects. CFM is 
definitely a component that should be taken into account in the REDD+ debate in 
terms of community participation. In Vietnam, CFM projects have been implemented. 
Unallocated community forests in four villages in the northern mountain region were 
selected as the project site, and the villagers secured joint ownership of community 
forest land (Pinyopusarerk, Thi, and Van 258). Khongsak Pinyopusarerk, Thi Thu Ha 
Tran, and Van Dien Tran found that CFM brought about a decrease in illegal logging 
and positive changes in the livelihood and environment, including enhancement of 
equality within community members (260). Economic benefits were minor, but 
planting and new plantations held the possibility to generate future income (260-61). 
The authors conclude that the project indicates the possibility of ensuring forest use 
rights of indigenous people by implementing CFM in Vietnam. Therefore, Vietnam 
should analyze the possibility of whether CFM can be utilized in REDD+ projects.  
 Overall, I discussed the possible success of utilizing CFM in REDD+ 
projects by analyzing CFUGs and REDD+ in Nepal. However, it does not mean CFM 
is a panacea for REDD+, or CFUGs in Nepal are a perfect example of enhancing 
community participation. In fact, CFUGs in Nepal have an issue in terms of gender 
equality. Maraseni et al. found that female participation in meetings in the 
communities studied in Nepal increased after REDD+ was implemented. However, it 
does not mean that all women are provided the opportunity equally. In fact, Khadka et 
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al. note that the majority of women have unequal access to resources and decision-
making processes in CFUGs (201). They found that the FCTF does not address 
gender issues in its meeting agendas at a local level and only occasionally at a central 
level (Khadka et al. 204). Poudel et al. argue that the Dalit women were severely 
disadvantaged; they lacked proper information about REDD+ including its potential 
benefit, and they did not know they qualified as recipients (193). Women are more 
dependent than men on forests and forest resources for daily consumption due to 
household tasks and collecting fire wood. Therefore, it is women who are more 
affected by REDD+ implementation, but they are not adequately involved in the 
decision-making processes of the projects. The gender issue is not the main focus of 
my research, and I will not further develop my argument on it, but this is one of the 
major problems of REDD+ in Nepal (in addition to BDS). Even though the CFUG-
based REDD+ projects improved the situation of women as a whole, there are still 
women who do not fully participate in the projects. 
 Another issue of REDD+ projects in Nepal is its dependency on CFUGs. As 
explained, the total area managed by CFUGs is only one third of the total forest area. 
All REDD+ projects are implemented in this small percentage of forest areas. It is 
clear that utilizing CFUGs in REDD+ is efficient and speedy as they have strong 
networks with a local government and know-how of self-governance, know how to 
cooperate with government agents, and have valuable experience of collective forest 
management. However, the tendency to depend on CFUGs may result in ignoring of 
other government-managed forests to launch REDD+ projects. It is not clear whether 
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the government will include those forests in REDD+ despite them being the majority 
of the total forest area. Also, there is little evidence of CFUGs being created by the 
implementation of REDD+ (Newton et al. 33). The government should establish the 
mechanisms to implement REDD+ projects in those forests or accelerate CFUG 





 One of the essentials of REDD+ is the involvement of forest-dependent 
people (who are often indigenous people who have been politically and economically 
marginalized in developing countries), so it is valuable to examine REDD+ and the 
extent to which it involves local community members. 
 The concept of REDD+ is new, and its framework is still being formed. The 
framework of REDD+ is changing as new issues, such as protecting indigenous 
people’s rights and establishing MRV systems, emerge. Recently, REDD+ has 
recognized the necessity of safeguarding livelihood benefits as an important the factor 
of the initiative, and the UN-REDD and the FCPF “view carbon, biodiversity, and 
livelihood goals as being inseparable, and these multiple conservation and 
development objectives are intertwined within the REDD+ discourse” (Newton et al. 
27). REDD+ has started to establish safeguards to protect indigenous people. 
However, its characteristics of a top-down manner of decision-making processes still 
remain. Whether REDD+ will successfully be implemented or not in terms of 
community participation depends on whether its surrounding institutions correct their 
top-down approach, and whether REDD+ can be promoted with protecting the 
livelihoods of indigenous people who live in the project areas.  
The case study in Vietnam revealed that the government of Vietnam has 
allocated the land with high productivity to the state management boards and state-
owned companies. At the individual level, only local elites receive the high quality 
land, and other individual households are allocated relatively lower productivity land 
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with limited management rights. Even though individuals can make contracts with the 
state agencies, transferring the management right makes the structure of the 
ownership more complicated. Moreover, individuals do not fully understand the right 
to participation in decision-making on forest contracting (Nguyen et al. 62). This may 
cause exploitation of the future benefits generated from REDD+ by state agencies and 
forest companies. 
 Discrepancy between customary law and statutory law has become another 
obstacle for REDD+ implementation in Vietnam. Even though the government states 
that it pays great attention to protect the rights of ethnic minorities (FAO et al. 16), it 
does not seriously try to solve the issue despite recognizing it before launching 
REDD+. Regarding the historical backgrounds of the relationship between the 
government and indigenous people, reflected by the enactment of assimilation 
policies and the fact that the government does not recognize them as “indigenous 
people” but as “ethnic minorities,” it seems that this history of exploitation affects the 
current attitude of the government towards indigenous people. The problem of 
traditional territorial boundaries was ignored under the policies that put priority on 
economic growth and involved indigenous people in international markets. As a 
result, the boundary issue still exists in Vietnam. The discrepancy of territorial 
boundaries means ambiguity of the responsibilities on the land. This directly causes 
conflict when allocating the benefits that the land generates. In order for equitable 




 It is also notable that the government of Vietnam maintains a tight control on 
forest management and the people. The initiative of the state government has led to 
the rapid policy development of REDD+ and a number of pilot projects. International 
expectation of Vietnam in REDD+ remains high, especially that of the UN-REDD 
Programme, considering its selection of Vietnam as the first Phase II-implementing 
country. Moreover, the research on media shows that media mainly represents the 
propaganda of the government and there is little reporting on REDD+ that reflects the 
community perspective. The government’s tight control is effective at a national level 
discussion of REDD+, but the top-down manner of decision-making processes 
disregards the opinions of indigenous people. The efforts to involve community 
participation are worth considering, but the government fails to solve the essential 
issues of land allocation and boundaries. 
 In contrast to Vietnam, in Nepal, communities’ self-governance has been 
established as one of the elements of CFUGs. Even though the burden on individuals 
is more intense than state-managed forest areas, since individuals in CFUGs have to 
decide everything about forest management, they will be motivated if their opinions 
on forest management are reflected within the communities they belong to. It seems 
that the unstable state government control on land and the people does not reach to a 
local level, creating a conducive situation for CFM in Nepal to practice self-
governance. 
REDD+ in Nepal showed its involvement of indigenous people. This is 
mainly due to the fact that Nepal has a solid framework of CFM. REDD+ utilizes 
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CFUGs’ network with the local government and their principle of self-governance 
effectively works in REDD+, promoting community participation.  
 I described how CFM will be effective in REDD+ implementation through 
analyzing the case of REDD+ in Nepal. In Vietnam, there are pilot projects that 
investigate the possibility of CFM in the country. The projects proved the 
effectiveness of CFM in ensuring forest management rights of indigenous people. The 
government should continue the projects and utilize the systems in REDD+ projects. 
 In terms of benefit distribution systems, the UN-REDD Programme is 
supporting the design of BDS in partner countries, especially in Vietnam (UN-REDD, 
Asia-Pacific). In Vietnam, the PES schemes will be the key to REDD+ BDS. 
However, it became clear that insecure land tenure of indigenous people is one of the 
major obstacles of PES in Vietnam. Utilizing the existing schemes is a quick and easy 
way to implement REDD+, but the problems of the exclusion of local participation 
due to insecure land tenure have to be solved before utilizing PES to REDD+ BDS.  
6.1. Recommendations 
 The recommendations for REDD+ in Vietnam will be at a state level. This is 
because the problems analyzed in this thesis are insecure tenure and discrepancy 
between the statutory and customary law, which are highly difficult to solve at an 
individual or a local level. The recommendations are as follow. 
 First, the government of Vietnam should consider incorporating customary 
law with statutory law. The rewards of REDD+ implementation are performance-
based, so a clear demarcation on who owns the right to forest management is 
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essential. Local community members will be reluctant to cooperate with the 
implementation if the tenure is not secured. At the same time, monitoring the flow of 
benefits to prevent elite capture is necessary. Also, clarifying the management rights 
of forests will help other areas that are not pilot areas of REDD+. There has been 
conflict where a territorial boundary defined in statutory and customary law is not 
consistent. It is a good opportunity for the state government to review the land 
regulations. The government should change its way of thinking against traditional and 
cultural value that indigenous people have and cooperate with them to identify 
customary land tenure. 
 The second recommendation for the government of Vietnam is to simplify 
the procedure of forest contracts between state forest owners and individual 
households and provide broader forest management rights to individual households. 
Forest contracts between state entities will provide opportunities for individuals to 
receive the right to forest management of higher-quality forest land. However, 
currently, due to a lack of understanding of individuals about rights to decision-
making of forest contracts, individuals are disadvantaged in the processes. Even 
though some of individuals participate in forest contracting, only half of them thought 
their opinions were reflected in the final decision of the process (Nguyen et al. 33). It 
is crucial to facilitate awareness-raising events for individuals to improve their 
understanding on forest contracts.  
 In addition to a lack of understanding of individuals, the complexity of forest 
management rights provided by forest contracts is problematic for REDD+. The 
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existence of state-owned forest companies is additional to the direct allocation from 
the government to individuals. This may cause the exploitation of benefits of REDD+ 
by state agencies. Even if there is no exploitation, it is obvious that the benefit 
distribution system will be more complex as there are more stakeholders of the forests 
which are allocated based on forest contracts. Therefore, the state government has to 
prepare a sound framework of the benefit distribution systems for this type of forest 
management structure. 
 Third, the application of CFM to REDD+ should be considered. The research 
shows that CFM can improve the situation of indigenous people, which may lead to 
the improved status of indigenous people in an unequal forest allocation system. If the 
pilot projects of CFM are completely proved to be effective and efficient, it should be 
utilized in REDD+ projects for protecting local community members’ rights in forest 
management.  
However, CFM in Vietnam is different from CFM in Nepal. In Nepal, as 
discussed, REDD+ was easily implemented in the CFM areas due to CFUGs’ well-
developed networks and know-how of forest management, providing a solid 
foundation for REDD+. As CFM in Vietnam is still in its infancy, it is not clear if the 
positive results of the research conducted by Pinyopusarerk et al. will be sustained for 
the long term. What the government of Vietnam can do is to analyze CFM in Nepal, 
of which a form of forest ownership and management system is similar, and utilize 
CFUGs’ governance structure. Particularly, it is urgently necessary to establish the 
self-governance from the perspective of community rights protection. Self-
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governance motivates community members’ participation, and it is expected that 
participation in meetings and MRV of REDD+ will be enhanced. Moreover, I believe 
that working not as individuals but as a group would empower community members 
in decision-making processes of REDD+ with the local government. 
One obstacle to CFM in Vietnam is “the lack of enabling and experience 
embedded within local authorities to implement government policy,” which causes 
local communities to ask for help from external institutions (Pinyopusarerk et al. 262). 
This can be solved by the intervention of NGOs. As seen, a number of environmental 
NGOs support REDD+ projects in Vietnam and will potentially be able to support 
CFM pilot projects in Vietnam. This does not mean that NGOs are necessarily the 
solution, but sometimes it is beneficial to utilize them as a support. At the same time, 
it is crucial that local authorities are educated so that they can establish CFM pilot 
projects without help of external organizations. What is important is, first, to analyze 
the relevant data of CFM in Nepal, and second, to implement CFM and REDD+ at the 
same time for efficiency. This may enable the protection of land tenure of indigenous 
people and reduce poverty among them in REDD+ project implementation.  
Fourth, in order to establish a sound framework of BDS, the government of 
Vietnam has to review lessons learned from the domestic experiences of PES. The 
issues found in PES are consistent with those of REDD+ in Vietnam itself: insecure 
land tenure of indigenous people and complicated processes and a lack of local 
participation derived from it in forest contracts. Therefore, the recommendation to 
REDD+ BDS is the same as above: to solve the issue of different traditional territorial 
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boundaries between customary and statutory law, and to simplify the processes of 
forest contracts. In addition, simplifing the hierarchy of land management right 
holders will further ensure distribution of the benefits to local households. Since local 
households are largely unfamiliar with forest contracts, supports from external 
organizations, such as NGOs, will be necessary. 
 Fifth, improvement of education of indigenous people will improve their 
participation in REDD+ and understanding of land tenure. Sufficient time should be 
taken on explanation and consultation since the idea of REDD+ is new. Also, REDD+ 
projects are long term contracts. Members should be given enough information, both 
positive and negative, to understand what projects are and how they are involved.  
Finally, the utilization of CFUGs in REDD+ in Nepal should be considered 
carefully. It is true that REDD+ in Nepal successfully involves indigenous people, but 
REDD+ projects’ dependence on CFUGs may result in the reluctance on 
implementing REDD+ in other state-owned forest areas. Therefore, the government 
must develop and evaluate the long-term national strategy that can be utilized in those 
forest areas. 
 Future research should focus on how the government will deal with the issues 
of land boundaries and how BDS will be established in the Phase II of UN-REDD in 
Vietnam. Will BDS emphasize the necessity of ensuring land tenure of indigenous 
people and simplifying the forest contract processes? By analyzing them, it will 
become possible to evaluate how the government emphasizes protecting the rights of 
indigenous people on forest land management and decision-making processes. 
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 The idea of REDD+ is innovative as it provides opportunities for developing 
countries to join carbon markets and to reduce carbon emissions through avoiding 
deforestation and forest degradation. However, REDD+ has to consider more about 
indigenous people since they are one of the participants and beneficiaries of the 
rewards generated by REDD+. Currently, debates surrounding REDD+ focus more on 
technical aspects than protecting rights of indigenous people. Whether REDD+ 
successfully involves indigenous people in project implementation depends on how 
REDD+ policy makers learn lessons from the current pilot projects, especially those 
aim at the empowerment of local community members, and emphasize the indigenous 
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